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VOLUME 9 FALL, 1973 NUMBER 2
MOST SENSIBLY CONSERVATIVE AND SAFELY
RADICAL: OKLAHOMA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATION OF ECONOMIC POWER,
LAND OWNERSHIP, AND CORPORATE MONOPOLY
By DR. RxmNARD J. SmicKLAm*
Am JA~Ms C. THOMASt
Fredric Bard, an early Oklahoman, characterized t h e
state's constitutional convention and the men who wrote that
document as "the most sensibly conservative and safely radi-
cal of all men who ever wrote a constitution."' In this brief
statement Bard captured the spirit of this new state called
Oklahoma, the essence of her people, and the balanced goals
of the young men of diverse backgrounds who sought to es-
tablish her early laws.
An understanding of Oklahoma's constitutional provisions
and the attitudes of her pioneer lawmakers is not only im-
portant for insight into current questions of Oklahoma law
but important in a far broader sense. For Oklahoma's early
experience provides a window through which we can take a
backward glance at how one frontier state set a pattern of
economic regulation which, in many respects, has since been
followed on a national scale while ironically being abandon-
ed within the home state of origin.
Oklahoma is certainly an appropriate state to so study.
Angie Debo was right when she observed that Oklahoma was
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa.
t Professor of Law, University of Tulsa.
' Frederick Bard cited in A. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF THE CONq-
STrrUTIONAL CoNvEvToN OF THE STATE OF OxLAHoMA (1923),
ix.
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"more than just another state" that Oklahoma was "a lens
in which the long rays of time are focused into the brightest
light." "In its magnifying clarity," she notes, "dim facets of
American character stand more clearly revealed. For in Okla-
homa all the experiences that went into the making of the
nation have been speeded up. Here all the American traits
have been intensified." There is more than hyperbole in Dr.
Debo's studied observation that "the one who can interpret
Oklahoma can grasp the meaning of America .... "2
In a very real sense Oklahoma is the quintessence of what
Daniel Boorstin has called "the American experience." The
spirit of this early Oklahoma and the attitudes we are herein
seeking to explore were summarized by William Jennings Bry-
an speaking in 1907 in support of the newly written Okla-
homa state Constitution. "You have the best constitution to-
day of any state in the Union, and a better constitution than
the Constitution of the United States. This is not extravagant
praise," the great commoner orated. "All the other states have
stood as your models. I want to compliment the cornfield
lawyers of Oklahoma . . . upon having puttied up all the
holes shot in the constitutions of other states by trust and
corporation lawyers.13
The purpose of this essay is to examine just one aspect
of one state's constitutional, legislative, and judicial history.
Our central question focuses on state regulation of economic
power in Oklahoma but may cast a shadow beyond the narrow
history of this nation's forty-sixth state. The original Okla-
homa constitutional provisions upon subjects such as land
ownership and corporate powers were regarded, at the time,
as "radical" enactments designed to preserve family farms
and small businesses. 4 And yet by 1960 the state with such
2 A. DEBo, OKLAHO _A: FOOT-LOOSE AN FANcy FREE (1949).
3 Cited in I. HuRST, THE 46TH STAR: A HISTORY OF OKLAHOMA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AN STATEHOOD 26 (1957).
4 G. FoEmAN, A HISTORy OF OELAHOMIA 316 (1942).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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radical limitations reported that all the estimated wealth in
the State of Oklahoma was held by 15% of the state's popula-
tion.5
If ever an essay reflects the joint efforts of authors with
varied economic, social, and philosophical viewpoints, this is
such a work. And yet, both are herein engaged in what Pro-
fessor Calvin Woodard has described as the challenge "to
conjoin changes in law with more general extra-legal move-
ments."' 6 Our undertaking raises two questions. The first:
What conditions produced the atmosphere which originally
led to the adoption of Oklahoma's regulation of economic
power? The second: How and why have these regulations
been modified?
HISTORICAL SETTING
Although Oklahoma's provisions of economic regulation
have traditionally been viewed as radical, they were, in fact,
considering the nature of the historical setting and the state's
economic position in 1907, rather, perhaps extremely, conser-
vative. For example, with respect to land ownership, the
Oklahoma Constitutional Convention was seeking to preserve,
as nearly as possible, a status quo ownership and philosophy
of land usage. In truth, the regulations enacted by the Okla-
homa Constitutional Convention represented a last desperate
struggle of the small homestead farmers and Indian nations
against what they, as Oklahomans, viewed as the chronic
failures in other states. They were guarding against the for-
eign land barons as in Texas,7 the octopus-like monopolies
R. FRmNCH, WEALTH m OKLAHOmA 2, (Bureau for Business
and Economic Research, University of Oklahoma, 1970).
6 Woodard, History, Legal History, and Legal Education 53
VA. L. REv. 121 (1967). Strickland claims to be "sensibly
conservative" and Thomas to be "safely radical."
7 See generally, J. HALEY, THE XIT RANCH OF TEXAS (1967);
H. MoTHERSHEAD, THE SwAN LAND AND CATTLE CoMPANY,
(1971); R. Am-EAm , WESTWARD THE BRITON (1953); W. JACK-
SON, THE ENTEPRISING SCOT (1968); L. JENKS, THE MIGRA-
TION OF BRITISH CAPITAL (1938).
19731
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and trusts consuming oil resources as in Kansas,8 and their
home-grown land hungry real estate speculators and exploi-
ters.9
Those who have sought to analyze Oklahoma's laws with-
out regard to this unique historical setting and the specific
nature of the state's land tenure and mineral ownership prior
to statehood have seen these early enactments regulating
economic resources as a radical effort by the "common man"
to seize control of the resources of the new state. In fact, such
laws represent an effort designed to preserve a broad based
control already generally secured. It was an effort not to gain
control but to retain control, to prevent, in Oklahoma, what
had happened in other states. It was a chance to keep land in
control and in reach of all men. Was it radical? Or was it
conservative? Certainly the laws departed from the establish-
ed pattern of most other states. Political labelling is, at best,
a risky task and subject to the danger of oversimplification.
The British social critic Christopher Dawson has reminded us
of the pitfalls with respect to defining. "What is liberalism
in one country," Dawson notes, "may be conservatism in an-
other and revolution in a third."'1
The Constitutional economic regulations which w e r e
thought to be so revolutionary and to bring Oklahoma into
the radical vanguard of state control were products of this
unique time and place. These provisions included the right
granted to the "state to engage in any occupation or business
for public purposes" except agriculture;" prohibition of mo-
8 F. SCHRUBEN, WEA CREEK TO EL DORADO: OIL = KANSAS
Chapter 5 and sources cited therein (1972).
9 See, e.g. In The Matter of J. H. Beck, (1894) "Opinions of
the Cherokee Supreme Court," Chrokee Nation Papers, In-
dian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society.
10 DAWSON, The Failure of Liberalism, in A. PEGIS (ed), THE
WISDOM OF CATHOLIciSm 864 (1949).
" Okla. Const. art. II, § 31. Citations to the Constitution are,
unless otherwise indicated, drawn from R. WILLIAMS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND ENABLING ACT OF THE STATE OF OKLA.
(1912).
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nopolies; 12 restrictions on "unlawful restraints of trade";13
control of banks and trust companies; 14 prohibition of gov-
ernmental aid to corporations; 15 prohibition of alien owner-
ship of land;' 6 and.limitation on corporation buying, acquir-
ing, or dealing in real estate.'7
To understand the forces which bear upon these land ten-
ure and economic regulations one must remember that Okla-
homa in 1907 was a vast territory only recently opened to
white citizens and historically divided in such a way that it
should never have been one state.' 8 The eastern half of the
state was the old Indian Territory and had earlier sought
statehood under its' own banner as the Indian state of Se-
quoyah.19 Much of the western half of the state had also at
an earlier time belonged to these Indian tribes but had been
wrested from their control and, after a period of use through
lease as cattle range, had been opened for small farm home-
steading with only a few scattered Indian areas remaining.20
"Single Statehood" versus "Double Statehood" was widely
debated in this area which was popularly known as the "Twin
Territories." Oklahoma, as students of this states history cer-
tainly know, was formed by the wedding of the old Oklahoma
and Indian Territories.21
12 Okla. Const. art. II, § 32.
13 Okla. Const. art. V, § 44.
14 Okla. Const. art. XIV, § 1.
15 Okla. Const. art. X, § 15.
10 Okla. Const. art. XXII, § 1.
17 Okla. Const. art. XXII, § 2.
18 R. GITTmNGER, THE FomATioN OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA(1939); D. STEWART, THE GoVEENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF
OKLAHoImA TERRITORY (1933); J. DuNN, INDiAN TERMTORY:
A PRE-CoM ONWEALTH (1904); and see articles in STURM's
STATEHOOD MAGAZINE and TwIN TERRITORIES MAGAZI.
19 A. MAxwELL, THE SEQUOYAH CONVENTION (1953); and C.
ALLEN, THE SEQUOYAH MovEmEIT (1925).
20 The case of the loss of the Cherokee outlet is typical. E.
PIERCE & R. STRICKLAND, THE CHEROKEE PEOPLE (1973).
21 Doyle, Single Versus Double Statehood, 5 CHRONIcLES OF
OKLAHOMA, 18-41, 117-148, 266-286 (1927).
1973]
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AGRARIAN and POPULIST
The men who wrote the Oklahoma Constitution we r e
elected from both sections. While they represented a variety
of peoples, most Oklahomans were farmers and their repre-
sentatives were more strongly pro farmer than anti corpora-
tion. Their concern with antitrust and monopoly was mostly
focused on those points at which corporate power might en-
danger the survival of the rural neighbors, small town shop-
keeper, and the family farm as a social unit. For example,
there was far greater fear of large-scale ownership of rural
land and corporate land speculation than of Standard Oil's
regulation of gasoline prices. Both subjects, it should be noted,
were objects of considerable debate but the paramount con-
cern of the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention was keep-
ing prime farm land available to all.22
Within early Oklahoma there were a number of groups
which significantly influenced the development of constitu-
tional economic regulation. Among these were t h e Indian
tribes, especially the Five Civilized Tribes located in the In-
dian Territory, the small farmer-settler of the Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, the cattleman and rancher, the infant labor movement,
and the powerful railroad interests and land-mineral specula-
tors. The Oklahoma constitutional provisions regulating land
and economic resources were produced by the interactions,
the clashes and compromises, between and among these pow-
erful interests. To understand Oklahoma's regulations one
must remember that they were produced when land specula-
tors and Indians and cowboys and dirt farmers and coal min-
22 For the official proceedings of the Oklahoma Constitutional
Convention see Transcriptions of Proceedings and Debates
of the Constitutional Convention of Oklahoma, Typed Manu-
script, Library, Oklahoma Historical Society. (Cited here-
after as OCC Transcriptions.) Another edited version was
published in 1908 at Muskogee as PRocEEDnGs OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PROPOSED STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA HELD AT GuTH=IE, OKLAHoMA, NovEMBER 20, 1906 TO
NovELxra 16, 1907. (hereinafter cited as OCC PROCEEDINGS.)
[Vol. 9, No. 2.
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ers came together to settle on the laws that would control
their own use of the resources of the new state to be known
as Oklahoma.
If ever there was a group which was populist by nature
it was the people of Oklahoma at the time of statehood in
1907. Many were populists without ever having heard the
word or even knowing such a "movement" existed. T hey
thought as populists and the Oklahoma Constitutional Con-
vention mirrored their thinking.
The tone of the "Con Con", as the Oklahoma Constitu-
tional Convention was popularly known, was set by the most
populist of the populists in the Presidential Address of Wil-
liam H. Murray, the man who had been elected by a coalition
of Farmers Union men and Sequoyah Convention delegates.2
Murray argued strongly in support of programs designed to
retain the agrarian basis of the state and he spoke for his
own home grown version of populist agarianism. From the
beginning he made it clear that he was not a radical and
viewed sound land ownership provisions as an antidote to
radicalism. "We should not attempt," he argued, "to correct
as our socialist friends have sometimes said, because every
citizen has a right to own, buy and control all the property
of whatever kind or class subject only to taxation."24
Murray was voicing the general philosophy of the con-
vention in his opening address. That speech summarizes a
general attitude which is reflected in the constitutional eco-
nomic-land regulations ultimately adopted.
2 For Murray's account of the election and the convention
see Murray, The Constitutional Convention, IX CHRONicLEs
OF OKLAHMA 133-138 (1931) and Murray's autobiographical
MEMOIRS OF GOVERNOR MURRAY AND TRUE HISTORY OF OKLA-
HOMA TOGETHER WITH HIs BIOGRAPHY, PHILOSOPHY, STATES-
mANSHIP, AND OKLAHOMA HISTORY INTERWOVEN IN THREE
VOLUMES (1945).




Strickland and Thomas: Most Sensibly Conservative and Safely Radical: Oklahoma's Constit
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1973
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
A measure of vast importance will be to provide
every possible means to promote home-owning in this
country, because its home-owners are its mainstay.
All writers of political economy and history have
taught us that a nation is weak or strong in propor-
tion to the number of home-owners. That nation is the
strongest which has the greatest number of home-
owners in proportion to the amount of soil and popu-
lation. That nation is the weakest which has the few-
est number of home-owners in proportion to t h e
amount of soil and population. Ireland, by reason of
a few men owning all the land, has had the sym-
pathies of the civilized world poured out to her for
a thousand years. This question of home-owning
touches more vitally every interest in my section of
the state, the Indian Territory, which is settled and
cultivated by tenant classes under those holding great
bodies of land under lease contracts. It has brought
about deplorable conditions in that section. The In-
dian citizen who lives in the city engaged in some
business or profession, is not affected gravely as is
the Indian who lives out on his farm and expects to
make it his home. If a few men and great corpora-
tions are to get control of the lands of the Indian in
the Indian Territory portion of the State, the removal
of restrictions will not mean happiness and prosperi-
ty, but rather the reverse. You will witness the con-
ditions when each town has its land agent, the repre-
sentative of some alien or foreigner or some foreign
corporation with the sole desire of increased rental.
They will care little about the society, the moral char-
acter or intelligence of their tenants. They might
place by the side of the Indian citizen or white home-
owner, a Dago or a John Chinaman as quickly as they
would a good citizen, because their sole desire is rent;
increased rent. Far rather would I be surrounded by
the owners of that soil who could become my neigh-
bors and who could assist me in building a school
house on every hill and a church in every valley, thus
promoting prosperity of the community and the puri-
ty of society.
Relative to the land proposition. The evils grow-
ing out of the ownership of land are these: Alien
ownership, corporate ownership and uncertainty of
ownership and expensive transfer of title. In my na-
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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tive state there is a tract of five million acres of
land owned by one British subject. Let us write it
into the Constitution that no alien shall own land in
the State of Oklahoma.
We must provide in the Constitution that no pub-
lic service corporation shall own any more land than
that which shall be necessary to operate its business.
We must make it unlawful, or at least refuse to
charter any corporation for the purpose of buying,
selling or speculating in land or acting as land agent.
Let the individual do the work. Deny that right to the
corporation and then the public service corporation
cannot dodge behind the provision prohibiting their
ownership of lands and we can wipe out the evils af-
fecting land-ownership and thus promote home-own-
ing in the State of Oklahoma.
Under no circumstances should we allow any
transportation company to engage in the coal mining
business or oil wells, farming or any other except that
of common carrier. We must declare all transporta-
tion companies and transmission companies common
carriers, and that their charges be fixed by law. We
must provide for a railway commission with power
to fix and enforce reasonable freight and passenger
tariffs, with authority to make a fair and reasonable
valuation of their property and prevent the issuance
of stocks and bonds by such corporations except for
money paid, labor done or property actually receiv-
ed, because there can be no such thing as a reasonable
freight rate without a reasonable and fair valuation
of the property of the carrier.2
5
INDIAN INFLUENCES
If there was one group which seemed to have a predomi-
nate influence on the attitudes and development of the new
Oklahoma government that group was t h e Five Civilized
Tribes of Indians. Foremost among the reasons for this in-
fluence was the experience which citizens of the Indian Ter-
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vention, a meeting called for the purpose of preparing for
the single statehood of the Indian Territory. Oklahoma his-
torians are in general agreement with Bill Murray that "some
of the most important provisions of the [Oklahoma] Consti-
tution derived their inspiration from the Sequoyah Constitu-
tion notably Article nine on Corporations.126
One should also remember that by the time of Oklahoma
statehood most of the Five Civilized Tribes had been op-
erating, for more than three-quarters of a century, their own
constitutional republics within the geographic boundaries of
what became Oklahoma. These Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws,
Chickasaws, and Seminoles were, by no means, novices at the
political process. The Cherokees, for example, had enacted
their first written law almost one-hundred years before the
Oklahoma Constitutional Convention in 1808.27
John Swanton, the Smithsonians' distinguished chronicler
of Southeastern Indian Life, reminded the people of other
states of the unprecedented democratic experience of Okla-
homa's Indian population. "Few of those old line Americans
who look askance, and withal somewhat superciliously, upon
the governmental experiments of certain of our younger states
realize that such experiments are by no means new to their
26 The Constitutional Convention, IX CHRONICLES OF OKLAHoMA
126 (1931).
27 For the general legal background and developments of the
Cherokees see R. STPicxLA , FmlE AND THE SPIRITS: CHERO-
KEE LAW FRom CLAN TO COURT (In Press). See also Strick-
land, Christian Goetlieb Priber: Uropian Precursor of the
Cherokee Government, THE CHRONIcLES OF OKLAHOMA
XLVII (1970), 264-75; Strickland, American Indian Law
and the Spirit World, JOURNAL OF AmERcAN INDim LAW 1
(1973) (In Press); Strickland, From Clan to Court: De-
velopment of Cherokee Law, XXXI TENNESSEE ISTORICAL
QUARTERLY 316-327 (Winter 1972); and E. PIERCE & R. STP cK-
LAND, THE CHEROKEE PEOPLE (1973). For a picture of the
traditional Cherokee legal system see J. REID, A LAW OF
BLOOD (1970); and for contract K. LLEWELYN & E. HO EBEL,
THE CHEYENNE WAY (1943).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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territory," Swanton writes, "and that five of a much more
unique character were initiated and consummated before the
present State of Oklahoma came into existence. These experi-
ments consisted in the organization of as many bodies of
American aborigines- the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creeks, Sem-
inole, and Cherokees-into small red republics, voluntarily
set in motion, and maintained with a considerable measure
of success .... Of course many other Indian tribes within
our borders preserved some form of self-government long
after intimate white contact, but, for the most part, these were
mere continuations of existing forms. In the case of the Five
Civilized Tribes we have attempted to cast Indian minds in-
to new collective moulds which were in large measure of
white origin ..... 28
And yet, the Five Civilized Tribes preserved in their own
governments much that was Indian in outlook. And many of
these aspects of Indianess were preserved, in turn, in the out-
look and attitudes of the state of Oklahoma. It is impossible
to understand and appreciate the Oklahoma experience of
regulation of land and economic resources without an aware-
ness of the absolutely unique experience of the government
and operation of the Five Civilized Tribes. For the leaders
of the Indian republics became the leaders of the Sequoyah
Convention which, as we have noted, in turn, produced many
of the leaders of the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention.
The mark of Indian attitude in Oklahoma government goes
far deeper than the Choctaw name Allen Wright suggested
for the home of the redman.29
28 J. SwpxToN, Introductory Note to G. FoREmm, THE FIVE
CrMZED TRIBES, at xii (1934).
29 This influence also extends beyond the formative period.
The consensus ethic of the Southeastern Woodland Indian
tribes survives in Oklahoma politics to this day. The un-
published independent studies of anthropologist Garrick
Bailey and political historian Anne Hodges Morgan suggest
that this factor has been significant in the national leader-
ship of non-Indian Oklahoma Congressmen and Senators.
1973]
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A picture of Indian land and resource utilization is nec-
essary in order to understand the land use and regulation
tradition which the delegates faced. The entirety of the east-
ern half of Oklahoma had belonged to the Indian Nations and
fee simple title to the land was vested in the tribe itself. In-
dividual title to the land was not fee simple but involved a
use fee based upon occupancy and productive utilization of
the land. In accordance with the ancient tribal customs and
under the specific written statutes there was a common own-
ership of the land and any tribal citizen was entitled to oc-
cupy and utilize as much land as he needed. These were, on
the whole, surplus land societies where individual improve-
ments were respected and individual initiative was encour-
aged. Farms were operated on an individual basis but many
of the mineral and timber resources were operated for col-
lective tribal benefit. In a sense, the tribe was holding the
land in trust for the people. 0
The statutes enacted by the Five Civilized Tribes reflect
this common ownership of property. Typical of these laws
are those of the Cherokee Nation.
Any person having peaceable possession of pri-
vate property, obtained through lawful means, and
claiming a limited or absolute right in the same, shall
be held, in law, to have a prior right of possession
thereto, against all persons obtaining possession there-
after, until the right of such person shall expire, or be
by him transferred to another for good or valuable
consideration, or until his right shall be disputed and
invalidated by due course of law. And any person
having a prior right of possession of any property, to
any other person, and the property being detained
by the latter from the former, without his voluntary
consent, may recover such property upon suit for pos-
session merely, without regard to, or investigation
had by the court, of other or higher title, either in
plaintiff or defendant of such suit. But such person
30 F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW, 206-236, 287-
294, 425-446.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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may submit to the court as plaintiff, the general ques-
tion of right, involving the right of possession of the
property, or be awarded possession of such property
merely as provided above, with the right accruing or
answering as defendant in all suits involving t h e
right, title and interest of the parties to such prop-
erty.31
Property shall be held to be in the legal posses-
sion and control of any person, when in his actual
possession, or in the actual possession of any person
in the service or employment of such defendant, tem-
porarily to use or take charge thereof. When property
consists of stock, the possession thereof shall be de-
termined as provided by law.32
Tribal regulation and control of mineral resources had
long been a difficult question for the little Indian republics.
Even before the arrival in Oklahoma of the main body of the
Cherokees, the question of the operation of saltworks or Saline
springs had presented a problem to the old Cherokee set-
tlers. 3 The Choctaw coal resources were of such great value
that this, rather than oil, was the most prized mineral de-
posit.34 While, in theory, all such resources were tribal in
ownership, licensing to citizens for personal development was
the common pattern with the tribe retaining a right to a per-
centage of the income from the natural resource.35
31 Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Article XV, Section 136
(1875).
32 Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Article XV, Section 139
(1875).
3 THE CONsTITUTIoN AND LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
(1852), 84-86. Grant Foreman Typescripts, "Saltworks," In-
dian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society; Rogers Files,
Indian Heritage Association, Muskogee, Oklahoma.
34 Choctaw Mining Records and Leases, Indian Archives, Okla-
homa Historical Society; see generally D. BAnw, THE CHOC-
TAW PEOPLE (1973); and A. DEBo, THE RIsE AND FALL OF nis
CHOCTAW REPUBLIC (1934).
35 The Cherokee law for example contained detailed regula-
tions for timber resources as well as the saltworks and
mineral resource provisions. For the full range of such re-
1973]
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The "Monopoly question" had long been central to the
"Indian question" and the two had been almost irretrievably
entwined in the land distribution and termination controversy
relating to the ending of tribal government. A major argu-
ment of those who supported an end to tribal status for the
Five Civilized Tribes was that Indian resources were effec-
tively monopolized by a very few wealthy mixed-breed In-
dians&36
Letters from the Office of the Five Civilized Tribes to
the Indian Office, Senator Dawes, and other advocates of the
distribution of Indian lands develop the monopoly argument
as do the Annual Reports of the Commission to t h e Five
Civilized Tribes. 7 Professor D. S. Otis reports this in his study
of the Dawes Act undertaken for the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs.
In those days the charge was often made that
under the tribal system in Indian Territory certain In-
strictions on economic enterprise see THE CoNsTITuTIoN A
LAws OF THE CHERoKEE NATIoN, passim, (1852); and A Sum-
mary of the Early Laws of the Cherokees, in R. STRICKLAND,
FE AND Tim SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROm CLAN TO COURT,
Appendix, (1974).
86 The issue of availability of resources was ignored by ad-
vocates of Indian land distribution. Much of the argument
was premised on the assumption that the fullblood or tradi-
tional Cherokee did not use as much of the public lands
as the mixed-blood and therefore the system was discrimi-
natory against the fullblood. And these arguments persisted
even when fullbloods memorialized Congress speaking
against distribution. It should be noted that these same In-
dians often refused to be enrolled and continued to fight
the allotment system. See Dawes Commission Correspond-
ence, Foreman Typescripts, Indian Archives, Oklahoma His-
torical Society.
87 To study the process examine correspondence, Foreman
Transcripts, Volume 20, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Histori-
cal Society, Letters of June 11, 1895; July 11, 1895; July 23,
1895; July 24, 1895; July 25, 1895; October 15, 1895; for the
government position see also Annual Reports of the Com-
mission to the Five Civilized Tribes, 1894 to 1905.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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dians had cornered for their own use large tracts of
land and being therefore powerful in their communi-
ties they had succeeded in persuading the tribal gov-
ernment to oppose allotment which would redistrib-
ute the land.3 8
Unquestionably the Five Civilized Tribes opposed the al-
lotment of tribal land in severality and they opposed it for
good reason.39 But the strategy of the proponents of allotment
was to make tribal opposition appear to be totally selfish in
nature and centered exclusively among a mixed-breed aris-
tocracy pictured as tyrannizing the fullbloods and monopoliz-
ing tribal resources.40 Typical of the polemic nature of these
pronouncements is the Report of the Commission to the Five
Civilized Tribes.
The Commission has heretofore reported how
completely the tribal governments have fallen under
the control of the mixed bloods and adopted citizens,
and have been used by them to secure to the exclu-
sive use and private gain of a few of their own num-
ber much of the tribal property in the land, and from
other sources everything valuable and capable of pro-
ducing profit. More than a third of the whole terri-
tory of one of the nations is exclusively appropriated
and fenced in by barbed wire to the sole use of a
few citizens for pasturage. In other of these nations,
under similar legislation, vast and rich deposits of
coal of incalculable value have been appropriated by
a few to the exclusion of the rest of the tribe, and to
the great profit of those who operate them and ap-
38 D. OTis, Tm DAwEs ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN
LANDs 43 (1973).
39 The most eloquent presentation of the position of the In-
dian tribes and the soundest evidence of the wisdom of
their position is found in Angie Debo's moving study AND
STnL THE WATEs RuN (1940). Typical of the tribal posi-
tions are those outlined in a series of Cherokee memorials
and in the editorials and news items in the tribal newspaper
THE CHEoo= ADVOCATE. Memorials of the Cherokee are in
the collections of the Thomas Gilcrease Institute, Indian
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propriate their products to their individual use. Simi-
lar legislation has enabled private individuals to appro-
priate the timber of vast pine forests and denude the
public domain of this essential element of future de-
velopment and growth. In short, almost everything
of tribal property in which every citizen Indian has
of right an equal share has, if of any value, been ap-
propriated to the use and gain of the few, while the
real full blood has been left destitute and crowded out
upon the mountains and unproductive land, to take
care of himself as best he can.
The condition of affairs has not improved since
the last report of the Commission. On the contrary,
the indications are very manifest that the discussion
of the question of a possible change has had the ef-
fect of stimulating an unusual activity in efforts to
realize as early as possible all available gains arising
from this exclusive appropriation of the use of com-
mon property. The grasp of those holding power up-
on the tribal resources has become firmer, and the
uses to which the powers of government have been
put for the benefit of the few have become more palp-
able and flagrant. Those thus prostituting the forms
of their laws to private gain have become so open
and bold in their operations as in many cases to free-
ly avow that the terms upon which they may be cor-
rupted are made more easy in view of the possibility
that the opportunity for such gain may be short.41
Such self-serving statements of the political commission
charged with producing allotment have long been taken as a
correct representation of the monopoly situation among the
Five Civilized Tribes while statements of men like Judge
Isaac Parker who declared he never saw a pauper Indian
among these tribes have been ignored. 42 The truth was that
intermarried and mixed-blood citizens did possess consider-
ably more resources than fullblood citizens but this was a
41 Annual Report of the Commission to the Five Civilized
Tribes Foreman Typescripts, Oklahoma Historical Society.
42 Reprinted in J. GREGORY & R. SnucKiAND, HELL ON TnE
BORDER: HE HANGED EIGHTY EIGHT MEN 196-199 (1971).
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matter of choice and of a desire to utilize opportunities gen-
erally available to all.4 3
The tribes were not monopolistic as the Dawes Commis-
sion had suggested but were, in fact, very strongly dedicated
to the concept of widespread utilization of resources by all
members of the tribe. In fact, the Indian utilization of re-
sources was working remarkably well and the members of the
tribes, especially the fullblood, were pleased with their land
tenure.44 Unfortunately, the biased picture conveyed by the
Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes became the orthodox
view. A far more objective and historically accurate view is
found in Angie Debo's moving book And Still the Waters Run.
Herein, Dr. Debo attacks the basis of the Dawes Commissions
conclusion that the Indian society was a society of monopoliza-
tion of resources.
These [Dawes statements] were naturally accept-
ed by Congress and the country at large as authentic,
and are still generally quoted uncritically by even the
most careful students of Indian history; but they are
no more objective than the manifestoes issued by the
average government before entering upon a war of
conquest. Unquestionably land hunger was the real
motive behind most of the agitation to terminate the
tribal regime, and a fairly good case could have been
made out in the name of 'manifest destiny.' They pre-
sented a completely unfair picture of the poor Indian
crowded back in the hills and living in abject poverty
while the rich leaders of the tribe monopolized the
productive land that belonged equally to all. [Tribal]
public attempts to regulate the size of holdings as
the Choctaw pasture limitation and the Creek ref-
erendum on proposed enclosures went further in pre-
venting land monopoly than any law ever passed by
an American state; and a garbled misrepresentation
of the Choctaw's system of public control of natural
43 For a comparison of the holdings see Cherokee Census, 1890,
Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society.
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resources came with especially bad grace from the
members of a race that in the short space of a cen-
tury had seen the greatest natural wealth in the pos-
session of any people pass into private an d often
rapacious hands .... It is evident that ... they were
attempting to hold the Indian to abstract and ideal
rather than comparative standards, for certainly the
poor Indian had a better chance to become a prosper-
ous farmer than the landless member of the white
man's society.45
ALIEN AND CORPORATE LAND OWNERSHIP
Albert Ellis, Second Vice-President of the Oklahoma Con-
stitutional Convention, explained the attitudes underlying
alien ownership provisions. "There was a desire," he noted,
"that the Convention in some form limit the Alien ownership
of land in the proposed State. Several propositions having
that end in view were submitted to the Convention .... A
[Special] Committee reported a composite proposition which
was passed and became a part of the Constitution. Other
states, notably California and Oregon have adopted alien
ownership of land laws seeking to accomplish the same end
as does this provision of the Constitution of Oklahoma. 40
It was not accidental that the alien ownership of land
restrictions, and all of the propositions and proposals relating
thereto, were originally referred to the Committee on Agri-
culture and reported favorably to the whole convention and
then to a special committee.4 Clearly this was an agrarian
proposal addressing a problem which was central to populist
thinking. The Texas experience with the British ranching
land syndicates stood vivid in the minds of delegates draft-
ing and debating Oklahoma's limitation on alien land owner-
45 A. DESo, AND STILL THE WATERS RUNr (1940).
46 A. ELLIs, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEION
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHomA 153-154 (1923).
47 To place the Oklahoma development in historical perspec-
tive read Clements, British Investment and American Legis-
lative Restrictions in the Trans Mississippi West, 1880-1900,
MssIssiPPi VALLEY ISTORICAL REVIEW 207-228 (1955).
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ship.48 In speaking to the Convention Alfalfa Bill Murray
warned specifically of the Texas problem. "In my native
state," Murray orated, "there is a tract of five million acres
of land owned by one British subject. Let us write it into the
Constitution that no alien shall own land in the State of
Oklahoma."49
Foreign ownership of the great ranch lands was a way
to fortune regularly exploited by the great financial mani-
pulators. The whole operation was wild and speculative. In
1882, for example, John Upton Terrell reports that ten multi-
million dollar British-American land syndicates were form-
ed.50 W. Scott Morgan, a n o t e d populist speaker, tabu-
lated foreign land holdings at more than 20,557,500 acres.
He concluded that "the amount of land in the hands of ...
twenty-seven foreign speculators is equal to a territory as
large as Ireland."51 Oklahomans were determined to prevent
this from happening here.
The question of alien ownership of land was but a minor
one when compared with the broader issue of trust and cor-
porate ownership and control of farm lands. W. Scott Morgan
did not limit his "land monopoly" literature to foreign specu-
lators but attacked all who stood against the small family
farm. He had tabulated grants of more than 209,344,233 acres
48 In fact, a number of the delegates in addition to President
Murray had been citizens of Texas and were familiar with
the Texas experience. Biographical Sketches of Delegates
at the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, Grant Fore-
man Vertical Files, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical
Society. See Also H. BRAYER, The Influence of British Capi-
tal on the Western Cattle Industry, IV, WESTERXERs' BRANm
Book (Denver) at 1-19 (1948); and R. Clements, British-
Controlled Enterprise in the West Between 1870 and 1900,
and Some Agrarian Reactions, XXVIII AGRIcuLTURAL His-
TORY 132-141 (1953).
49 OCC PROCEEDINGS, 18.
10 J. TERRALL, LAND GRAB: TnE TRUTH ABOUT 'THE WNunmm OF
Tm WEST' 220-223 (1972).
51 W. Scott Morgan cited in THE PoPuLsT READER (1963), 68.
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given to railroads, an amount of land which he tabulated at
"almost equal to the thirteen original colonies" and "larger
than the whole of England and France." The populist figures
were shocking- four million acres in the estate of Colonel
Murphy, one million acres owned by Standard Oil, the Diston
domain in Florida of two million acres.52
Those Oklahomans who gathered at Guthrie to enact the
new constitution were familiar with these populist arguments.
I fact, the convention's President, Bill Murray, had written
that soon after he had left Texas for the Indian Territory
he had decided that the Populist theories were correct.53
And thus Murray and his colleagues put a Populist stamp on
the Oklahoma Constitution.
In a way there was something, too, of the cattleman-
farmer conflict present in the Oklahoma brand of populism
with its conception of land ownership. For prior to the open-
ing of the western portion of the state to settlement by run
this had been "cow country" and not "homes for farm folk"
as later day state politicians liked to call the newly opened
country. The historical clash over economic interests reflect-
ed in the opening of tribal lands to white settlement is por-
trayed by the Dean of Oklahoma's frontier historians the late
Edward Everett Dale.
Oklahoma was one of the last of the agricultural
states to contain large areas devoted exclusively to
grazing. Moreover, it presents perhaps the best ex-
ample in our history of the changing of considerable
regions from one form of agriculture to another by
governmental action. When the great Indian reserva-
tions were opened to settlement it is popularly be-
lieved that the land was taken from the Indian and
given to the white man. As a matter of fact the Indian
did not use the land and so as an economic factor in
the history of the region is negligible. The man who
really used these lands was the ranchman, and what
52 Id
53 MuxiAy, MEMOMS, I, 308.
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really happened in the opening of large reservations
to settlement was that the land was taken from the
cattleman and given to the farmer, or its use changed
by governmental action from grazing stock to t h e
growing of crops. Even after the last Indian lands had
been settled there was a considerable production of
beef cattle in Oklahoma, but this was by stock farmers
rather than ranching, and the passing of the Indian
reservation meant, largely speaking, the passing of
the ranch cattle industry.54
By the time of statehood and the Oklahoma Constitutional
Convention the traditional Indian land tenure system had
been changed by government action. The Five Civilized Tribes
had felt the sting of the Dawes Commission and the Curtis
Act. Against their tribal protestations the vast lands formerly
held in common by all of the tribe had been distributed. The
former tribal domain had been, under federal law, allotted
on a per capita basis in fee simple to the individual mem-
bers of the tribe subject to certain restrictions including
limitations on alienability. The process of alloting the lands
of the great eastern Oklahoma Indian Nations had set off a
land-grab of previously unequalled magnitude. 5
Speculating in Indian land had led to the formation of
land companies whose only purpose was to deal in this re-
cently allotted land; wholesale abuse of the citizens of the
Indian Nations was widespread.5 6 An understanding of this
54 E. DALE, TnE RANGE CATTLE INDusTRY: RANCHING ON THE
GREAT PLAINS FROM 1865 to 1925, 146 (1930).
55 Involved was the transfer of the entirety of Eastern Okla-
homa from a state of fee simple ownership vested in the
Nations of the Five Civilized Tribes to an ultimate state of
fee ownership of the land in the hands of individual citizens
of the Five Tribes. Those who doubt the complexity of the
operation need only examine land titles in the areas form-
erly owned by the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chicka-
saws, and Seminoles.
10 The official record can be pieced together from Manuscripts
From the Office of the Superintendent for the Five Civilized
Tribes in the Indian Archives of the Oklahoma Historical
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background clarifies the demand for the regulations in the
Oklahoma Constitution preventing corporate ownership and
speculation in real estate. Only large corporations and trusts,
the delegates at Guthrie felt, could afford to acquire rights
in land which, according to federal restrictions, would not
become alienable, in many cases, for as long as twenty-five
years. 7
Another concern long building among the Indian dele-
gates and almost as important as the behavior of corporate
land companies was railroad speculative activity in townsite
development. The citizens of Indian Territory had found rail-
roads to be less concerned with providing transportation
than with securing rights in Indian tribal property. The lines
were expert in the questionable practice of using the location
of a railroad to promote their dubious land dealings as well
as generally exploiting mineral, timber, and agricultural re-
Society. The Creek statesman, editor, interpreter, and poet
Alexander Posey presented the Indian side of the story in
a series of Letters from Fus Fixico. In commenting on the
Oklahoma Constitutional Convention Fux Fixico wrote:
"Well, guess so," Tookpefka Micco he say, "Alfalfa Bill an'
Boss Haskell was put near ready to let their work so shine."
An' Hotgun he spit in the ashes an' say, "Well, so, not hardy.
It was slow business to get started out right. It was take
lots o' time to draw up the plans an' specifications. So,
they didn't had non o' the immortal document written yet
but the scare headlines, an' they was had a big confusion
o' tongues before they got that far." An' Tookpafka Micco
he say, "Well, so what was trouble anyhow?" An' Hotgun
he go on an' say, 'Well, so, they couldn't decide, what name
to give the Great Spirit." Then Tokpafka Micco he smoke
an' look under the bed an' say, "Well so, Alfalfa Bill an
Boss Haskell an' Henry Asp could settle their differences
an' saved lots o' work for the printer an' give general satis-
faction if they had recognized Confucins for the Chinaman,
an' Budda for the Hindu, an' Mohamet for the Turk, an'
Saint Patrick for the Irishman, an' the totem pole for the
Eskimo, an' the almighty dollar for the American."
57 OCC Transcriptions, Debates, February 4 and February 13,
1907.
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sources. Railroad operations had long been a source of bitter
internal strife in most of the tribes. Their leaders resented
the way in which their own governments and tribal delega-
tions in Washington had been abused by the railroad men
and the government functionaries who danced to the tune of
the railroad lobby.58 So railroads were corporations creating
more than the usual fear of monopoly power; railroads had
a previous record which many citizens of Indian Territory,
including the President of the Convention, Bill Murray, view-
as criminal.Y9
To some the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention was
seen as an allegorical drama, the classic struggle between
the rights of people and the rights of property. Albert Ellis
later recalled "it was felt by good men everywhere in the
Government that if Oklahoma should write a progressive
Organic Law, it would be a step in human progress and wield
a beneficent influence throughout the Government. But
should Oklahoma adopt a Constitution of the regulation type,
guarding more closely the rights of property than the rights
of its citizens, a step backward would be taken."60
CONTROL OF CORPORATE POWER
The task undertaken at Guthrie was not to "get" cor-
porations but rather to have a way of "getting at" them if
need be. We should emphasize that the attitudes were not
essentially anti-corporation but, rather, anti-trusts or against
58 Memorials of the Five Civilized Tribes against the rail-
roads and especially with references to land right assign-
ments have been collected by the Indian Heritage Associa-
tion. Railroads exerted tremendous power over the fate of
the Eastern Oklahoma Indians as a result of concessions
obtained from the tribes following the American Civil War.
The influence of the railroad in Indian Territory is re-
flected in V. MASTERSON THE KATY RAILRoAD AmD THE LAST
FRONTIER (1952).
69 MuRRAY, 1IEmoms, III, 349-352, 593-596; OCC Proceedings, 20.
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evil corporations and corporations acting in an evil and de-
structive manner. The men at the Constitutional Convention
were certainly aware of the importance of corporate organiza-
tion in the development of the resources of their new state.
The debates reflect this recognition and the further recogni-
tion of the importance of balancing the growth question with
the abuse aspect of large scale business organization and the
dangers this created for agriculture.6 '
We can conclude that the number one concern motivating
economic regulation at the Oklahoma Constitutional Conven-
tion was the protection of individual ownership of resources,
especially of the preservation and encouragement of individ-
ually owned and operated family-style farms. Equally certain
is the fact that the number one public enemy and primary
corporate villain was perceived to be the Standard Oil Com-
pany. And one may further conclude that the regulation of
agricultural and business monopolies was seen as a part of
the same general issue. The problem was viewed as most
critical at that point where the issues were overlapped by
corporate domination of public transportation and access to
agricultural and timber markets.
Again, the attitude was most clearly summarized in the
President's opening address. "We must conserve the public in-
terest in every way possible," Murray noted. "We must shut
our ears to the clamor of 'Special Interests' and corporate
graft and greed. There is but one interest. I know of no in-
terest save the public interest .... Let us march forward in
solid battalions against the quartette of the railroads, Stand-
ard Oil, coal operators, and land grafters whenever they mar-
shall their forces against the people.16 2
Charles N. Haskell, soon to become the first governor of
61 See generally Debates of the Oklahoma Constitutional Con-
vention especially those of early February. OCC Transcrip-
tions.
62 Murray cited in OCC PaocEmins, 25.
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the State of Oklahoma, moved swiftly by introducing a reso-
lution described by Haskell as designed "to destroy the mo-
nopoly of the Standard Oil Company as it exists under the
Oklahoma Territory law."63 The power which Standard Oil
already exercised in the old Oklahoma Territory, the western
half of the proposed new state, was feared by men like Haskell
who had been elected from the old eastern or Indian Terri-
tory section. The Haskell Resolution is quite specific in pur-
pose. The monopoly of Standard Oil is the villain; Oklahoma
is charged under the Haskell wording with destroying the
monopoly forever. The resolution is as follows:
Whereas, it appears from the showing made of
the existing laws governing oil inspection in the Okla-
homa Territory, that said laws are so framed as to
exclude all oils except those controlled by the Stand-
ard Oil Company from the territorial market by rea-
son of technical rules, wholely without benefit to the
consumer, and which result in Oklahoma oil consum-
ers being charged about forty per cent more for the
oil that they use than the same company charges for
similar oils in the adjoining states; and
Whereas, should this law be extended over the
whole state, as it would be under the terms of the
statehood bill, unless we otherwise provide, it would
destroy the market for the oil produce of our own
state in our own market;
Therefore, be it Resolved, that this monopoly of
the Standard Oil Company be forever destroyed and
prohibited, and to that end the Committee on Com-
merce shall report a provision substituting the oil test
laws of the state of Texas as a substitute for the
Oklahoma Territory, such substitute to be and remain
the law of the new state until the legislature other-
wise provides.6
Haskell justified his resolution as follows:
The Oklahoma oil test is a technical test, and it
is one that no oil producer or manufacturer in this
3 OCC Transcriptions, Session, February 13, 1907.4 Id.
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country can comply with excepting the Standard Oil
Company, and hence they have an exclusive market,
and as a result they are charging 12 cents a gallon
for oil in Oklahoma that the same company sells the
same oil in three cities of Oklahoma for eight cents
a gallon, and I am also informed from the same source
that if, under the provisions of the statehood bill, this
particular Oklahoma Territory law is allowed to go
in force over the whole state, that it would absolutely
exclude the home product, although equal in every
respect- would absolutely exclude it from our home
market.65
CORPORATE POWER DEBATE
In the debates on the Haskell Resolution none of the dele-
gates seemed willing to defend the economic practices of
Standard Oil although a few were apparently sympathetic
and did attack the inefficient performance of the independ-
ents. Others reacted strongly to what they viewed as a slur
on the laws of the old Oklahoma Territory. Some objected
to the use of the Texas oil laws in the interim before the
first Oklahoma legislature met and a few attacked specific
detailed provisions of the Haskell Resolution. The following
excerpts from the debate show that despite the differences
over means of regulation, there was a strong anti-monopoly
feeling running through the convention and a widespread de-
termination to curb the common practices of Standard Oil.
Mr. Asp: Mr. President, I have no desire to defend a
monopoly. I feel, however, that the language of this resolu-
tion is not respectful to the territory of Oklahoma, or the
legislature that passed the law .... Now, what does this Con-
vention know, as a Convention, of the oil test law of Texas?
Now, the substitute which I offered is as follows:
"In view of the oil production in Indian Territory
and Oklahoma it is desirable that the new state should
have from the outset the best possible law relating
65 Id.
$a1&
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to the testing and the sale of oils in the state of
Oklahoma,
"Therefore, Resolved, that the Committee on
Commerce be instructed to investigate the laws re-
lating to the testing of oil from other oil producing
or using states, and if the present law in the Terri-
tory of Oklahoma is not sufficient, or if a better law
can be obtained, to report to this Convention a pro-
vision substituting the oil test law of such other state
as a substitute for the laws of the Territory of Okla-
homa."
Mr. President, I have been advised, as is stated in this res-
olution, that nobody can do business in Oklahoma except the
Standard Oil Company. I have been advised by the public
press and by a common understanding throughout the length
and breadth of this land, that nobody does oil business in the
state of Texas, except the Standard Oil monopoly, and I have
good Democratic authority for this statement. Why is it we
should cast or attempt to cast a slur upon the Territory of
Oklahoma here when you are going to join hands with the
Territory of Oklahoma and help to make the greatest state
in this great Union? Now I am not in favor of the Standard
Oil. What I want is intelligent action in this connection; what
you should have is intelligent action in this Convention. How
can we have that but by instructing the Committee on Com-
merce to investigate this matter. .... ?
Mr. Haskell: It is with the kindliest spirit and fellow-feeling
that we of the Indian Territory are now joining hands with
the oppressed of Oklahoma to contend for honest government.
If we have indicted any legislature of Oklahoma, if we have
indicted the Standard Oil Company, in this resolution, we
are willing to put them upon trial before sentencing them. I
am willing, so far as I am concerned, that the following shall
be inserted in my resolution. Be it resolved, and then inserted
this, "if the above be found true by the Committee on Com-
merce." I will state right now, it will be. The following with
the resolution as it reads, that this monopoly of the Standard
Oil Company be forever destroyed. Mr. Asp will not argue
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that if it be found true that it should not be destroyed so
far as every portion of this territory is concerned.
Mr. Asp: Will you yield to a question?
Mr. Haskell: Yes, sir.
M/fr. Asp: I will not deny that, and I will ask you the ques-
tion if it also be found true that the Standard Oil Company
controls the state of Texas in its grasp, and there can be a
better law obtained from some other state, wouldn't you be
willing to take the law from some other state in preference
to Texas?
Mr. Haskell: Absolutely. I would like Kansas in preference
to Texas if it should be as good or better, but I want to say
to you that I want anything that will do better than the
present Oklahoma Territory law. I will make that amend-
ment, "or the law of such other state as the committee may
recommend."
We' could convict the Standard Oil Company under most
any kind of resolution. . . . The statehood bill extends the
law of Oklahoma except where otherwise provided. Now, I
just want to otherwise provide as to this oil business; if not
you would have about six months of the time in which our
people in the Indian Territory would have as rough a deal
for us as you people have had over here.
Mr. Tener: .... Now, sir, Mr. President, I don't want this
Constitutional Convention to investigate the Standard Oil
Company or any other monopoly in this territory.
Mr. Haskell: The resolution does not direct the investigation
of the Standard Oil Company; it directs a comparison of the
law of this state with the law of other states -with the law
of Texas or Kansas, for example. . ..
Mr. Tener: I am aware of the fact, Mr. President, that there
is a monopoly on oil in Oklahoma Territory; I am aware of
the fact that you can order oil from Oklahoma City at a lit-
tle point 18 or 20 miles from that point from an independent
oil company and it will take all the way from two to four
[Vol. 9, No. 2.
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weeks to get that order filled. I am aware of the fact that
you can order oil from Oklahoma City from the Standard
Oil Company, and you can get it delivered at your town by
the first train. What I oppose is this, that we now as a con-
stitutional convention assume to investigate the laws of other
states and make them applicable to any portion of this state.
I believe that both of these resolutions should be voted down.
Mr. Graham: This proposition was put in here to prevent cor-
porations from owning property in towns and cities for the
reason that where a new line of railroad striking out through
a section of country prevents it from buying up land three
or four miles from a prosperous county seat and not run-
ning the railroad through the county seat and absolutely kill-
ing the town. We discussed this very thoroughly before the
committee and the committee was of the opinion that cor-
porations should be restricted to owning land within cities
and incorporated towns.
Mr. Swarts: I was very much impressed with the remarks
of Mr. Haskell on this floor here this morning when he made
the statement that corporations when properly organized and
properly controlled are a great thing for this or any other
country. It seems to be lodged in the bosoms of some peo-
ple that whenever you mention a corporation you have men-
tioned something that is gnawing at the vitals of republican
principles. It seems to be the impression of some people that
whenever you mention corporations it includes everything
that is bad in trusts, monopolies and combinations. I want to
say to you Mr. Chairman that in the section of territory
where I live, and not only in that section, but in many others,
the great future of that country depends upon the building
up and prosperity of a class of people that we are endeavor-
ing to control under the report of this committee. Mr. Chair-
man, I believe in making a law to properly control a system
of industries like private corporations for the new state of
Oklahoma; that this convention ought to take care that in
the power of control of those things they do not carry them
to such an extent that they become useless. I take it, sir, that
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an individual is a good thing for the state properly controlled.
We have our penitentiaries in which we incarcerate people
that violate the law, and sometimes it becomes necessary for
us to resort to more severe means in order to control those
whose crimes extend to a graver character, and it seems to
me that in the organization of corporations in this new state.
We have been talking about the gas situation. My friend Wil-
liams inserted two or three provisions the tendency of which
is to keep gas within the new state. Do you know who is
going to use it? The very people that you are trying to con-
trol under the report of this committee is going to use this
gas, if it is used at all. Now in my opinion a constitutional
provision that governs the corporations of the new state ought
to be liberal; it ought to be liberal in the main. However, I
take it on the other hand that very severe and stringent meas-
ures ought to be placed upon the statute books of this state
to control corporations as well as individuals that violate the
law and obtain the people's money under false pretenses.
I know of cases and circumstances in which corporations
have been enabled to buy up tracts of land in additions to
towns; they have been enabled to lay streets, construct elec-
tric light and water plants and lay out parks and sell those
lots to men who work on an average for fifty to seventy-five
dollars a month and thereby enable the people of that town
to acquire their own homes. I want to say to you, Mr. Chair-
man, that whenever a man by reason of his means acquires
a piece of property or may desire to acquire a piece of prop-
erty and pays value received for it and comes into the com-
munity and becomes a valuable citizen, whether as a private
citizen or a corporation, I am in favor of encouraging that
man. I am willing to enforce the old rule that that man is
considered innocent until he is proven guilty, and I am will-
ing to concede that that corporation is a good thing to the
community until by some violation of the law it shows itself
to be something else, and I would be in favor in this report
of the committee to not only going to the extent that Judge
Maxey is going, but I would be in favor of striking out the
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whole section. It occurs to me that it is strictly improper as
a constitutional proposition. I take it that a few broad prin-
ciples laid down in the constitution to form a basis on which
the legislature ought to be able to build a statute for the
people of the new state is all that is necessary and is as far
as I am in favor of going to the control of corporations.
I thought I would say nothing this evening, but hearing
what I have here I am thoroughly convinced that there are
parties on this floor that have never had much experience
in the developing of new countries. I agree with my friend
Swartz that it is absolutely necessary to invest capital to
build up any city or new country. I agree with my friend
Maxey that this amendment and then some should be accept-
ed. I find in a new country that many enterprises come along
that are needful that it is impossible for individuals to put
on foot and are good for the upbuilding of our country. It is
absolutely necessary to have corporations for these enterpris-
es. I find that in these places it becomes necessary some time
to deal in land; I find that it is necessary to deal in many
things all varying a little from the matter before the house.
I find an organization or company are oft times forced to en-
gage in a business that they care not to engage in to save
their own interests: For instance an oil mill. They are possi-
bly forced to engage in the grain business; they are possibly
forced to buy land or build feeding pens; they are possibly
forced to go into the feeding business to utilize their own
products. Now I say that in this proposition you are going
to enact a measure that will continually cripple our new
country. Now as to my friend Maxey's amendment, it becomes
absolutely necessary to organize companies to start any great
enterprise in this country, and I take it that this provision
adopted as it now stands will absolutely prevent it.
President Murray: I want to say in connection with this that
the main evil of corporate ownership is not for the purposes
ordinarily for which corporations acquire land. The evil lies
in the transportation company getting hold of land for the
purpose of engaging in some business other than common
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carrier. The other evil is the forming of corporations for the
purpose of buying large bodies of land.
In the first place, when you permit a railroad or common
carrier to own real estate you give them authority to engage
in the coal mining business; you give them authority to en-
gage in any other business in competition with the men who
are producing the stuff to be transported. I remember dis-
tinctly in my section I desired to clear some land as also did
one of my neighbors. We had an opportunity to sell the wood
off of that land at a high price at Denison, Texas, but by
reason of the fact that the railroad was engaged in the coal
business and the wood was in competition with the coal busi-
ness, they refused practically to haul our wood. There were
plenty of laborers willing to clear the land for what the wood
would bring, but the railroad refused to haul the wood. This
is the main evil in corporate ownership. The second is the
organization of corporations for the purpose of buying large
bodies of land to rent out and draw the rents. Where the
ordinary corporation comes along and buys a few hundred or
thousand acres of land that don't hurt, and for that reason I
introduced a provision in this convention denying the right
of any transportation company to own land other than what
is necessary to operate its business; then one that further
denied them the right to hold land as trustee, or otherwise,
and I want to say to you that the clause in this provision
that makes an exception to the trust company to hold in trust
will defeat the entire object of it. If you want to make it ef-
fective and prevent the corporate ownership of land you must
provide that they shall not hold it in trust. When you find
them with the land in their possession and when you attack
them on the possession of the land they will say "we don't
hold this land in fee. They will hide under that blanket, and
when you make an ironclad rule in your constitution you
bring about the vile corporations referred to by the gentle-
man a while ago. The only thing you can do to my mind is
to prevent transportation companies from owning land ex-
cept necessary for their business, and then provide that they
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shall not hold it as trustee or agent or otherwise and they
cannot hide under the cover. Leave other corporations to buy
land as they please, except that no corporation shall act as
land agent or be chartered as a land speculating company. If
you take that step you can then take the next step by putting
a graduated tax on the excessive owner. If you provide strict-
ly against all, the gentlemen who just left the floor is telling
you truthfully that you kill progress and you won't correct
the evil that ought to be corrected.
I recognize the necessity of corporations as stated by Mr.
Swartz and other gentlemen but I hope you will not make
an exception that will absolutely destroy the provision. If you
will provide that no transportation company shall own land
or act as land agent, and then provide that no corporation
shall act as land agent- leave it with the individual- and
then put a graduated tax on the large holder, corporation or
individual, then you will correct the evil, and leave the ordi-
nary corporation to handle suburban property, and then you
will take the ownership of large bodies of land in this coun-
try out of the hands of the corporations and get it in the
hands of the individual owner and farmer, but you cannot
do it by this provision. I apprehend the gentleman who studies
this question only studied it surface deep because the very
exception in itself destroys it. You must look at this question
in every light.
Mr. Baker: At the present and heretofore we incorporated
in the Indian Territory for the purpose of buying and sell-
ing real estate and there are many corporations engaged in
that business down there now and the deed is made to the
corporations and you go around and sell that stock and get
money on which to incorporate and then you buy land with
that money of the business of that corporation. Now what
are you going to do with this provision; destroy that busi-
ness, or will it create a monopoly in that business.
President Murray: I think this convention has the power to
draft a provision that will prevent these corporations from
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operating. I do not understand that they have a vested right
in their franchises. I do not think they could be disturbed
in any property they own.
Mr. Baker: Then the new state land company that I own
stock in will be wiped off the map?
President Murray: And I say to you they ought to be wiped
off the face of the earth, because the continued operation of
these people will eventually mean that the Indian Territory
will be owned by corporations, and I want the farmers to own
that country. I want to say I hope this convention will settle
this question and settle it rightly. If you don't do it in this
convention we will have a constitutional amendment that the
farmer's will carry through this state. The time to do it is
before restrictions are removed on those Indian lands. When
you understand that the great body of those lands are held
by corporations with the restrictions removed today they
would be the only people who could buy it. Not a single farm-
er would think of buying property he couldn't get possession
of for several years. Not a single bank or trust company
would loan money on land they couldn't get possession of for
years to come, and if you don't make some provision the
greater portion of these lands will be in the hands of those
corporations with all the attending evils.
The reason you say to a corporation that you shall not
own land is to prevent the evils of land ownership; it is done
for the express purpose of defeating the evils arising out of
that ownership and not affecting that corporation directly,
because whether they own the land or not they can go ahead
with their corporation business.
Mr. R. L. Williams: If we are going to get after corporations
we should place a limitation on their power. If we don't pre-
vent corporations from acquiring farm lands in the Indian
Territory you are going to make it hard for farmers to buy a
home. Under the peculiar conditions in that section of the
country a concern is organized and has its paid attorneys and
experts and gets hold of the land when the restrictions are
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removed, and while it is honorable and I don't believe we
ought to make war on the corporations, yet no corporation on
earth should be permitted to organize to deal in farm lands.
If there are any things here that are too severe when it comes
to the question of the cities, let's amend it, but let us never
permit corporate greed to fasten itself upon the agricultural
lands of this state.
Mr. Lehy: Have you any objection to putting in here that cor-
porations shall not engage in farming?
Mr. R. L. Williams: No, sir, I have not. I am absolutely in
favor of that.
Mr. R. L. Williams: At the same time fix it so that when the
restrictions are removed in the Indian Territory and the land
is thrown on the market that corporate greed will not gather
it up and sell it to the home seeker at an enormous price.
Mr. Baker: Do you think under the pretext of limiting the
powers of these corporations in the Indian Territory that you
can absolutely destroy the business under the pretext of lim-
iting?
Mr. R. L. Williams: If they have already acquired land of
course we cannot interfere with their vested rights, but I am
in favor of fixing it so that no corporation, after the ratifica-
tion of this constitution, can acquire a sngle foot of agricul-
tural land. Let them acquire the land in the cities; I don't
object to that. Let them acquire additions and develop the
cities. I wouldn't see this convention take a single step to hold
back the development of this state. But let me tell you unless
you do something to prevent the farm lands of the state from
falling in the hands of corporations you will have a state of
surfdom. You know the result then. That don't build up good
citizenship.
President Murray: We are now not dealing with corporations;
we are dealing with the land proposition.
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President Murray: The whole subject deals with "the land
question."
Mr. R. L. Williams: Didn't you try to get an amendment in
here so they could only be organized for one purpose.
Mr. R. L. Williams: We are dealing with corporations and land
here is an incident to that corporation.
Mr. Williams: A trust company under this provision cannot
own a foot of land unless it is committing fraud on the state
and it would be the duty of the governor to see that it was
confiscated and became state property, and if we want to be
true to the people we want to seize every opportunity. The
graduated tax, that will reach the individual.
Mr. Williams: I wouldn't have any objection to a corporation
selling land where there was a nearby city. I don't believe I
would like to see people going around over the country and
making lots worth five hundred dollars where there is noth-
ing but blue sky, but where we have a town or city already
built and where capital is necessary to bring in additions and
bring about development, why I can see the necessity for that,
but it don't take a corporation to do it.
Mr. Asp: Suppose you are engaged in building a railroad. Your
line is surveyed and there are places along the line where
towns are platted and there are stations to be located along,
do you see any good reason why a corporation should not have
a right to buy the land and sell it as a townsite?
Mr. Williams: I tell you why I would be opposed to that. It
has been the policy to have a fellow by bonuses virtually
build the railroad, and to have somebody else give the town
and then let the railroad sell it seems to me not exactly right.
It seems to me like the man that bears the burdens of the
country ought to have some rights in the premises. If we can
vouchsafe the proposition in this country so that a corpora-
tion cannot own a foot of farming land somehow or other,
the fellows in the cities will be able to take care of themselves.
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Mr. Asp: You haven't pointed out what there is in the propo-
sition submitted by the committee that permits corporations
to own farm lands.
Mr. Graham: The committee does object to a portion of that,
that portion which states that corporations may acquire land
for the purpose of laying out new towns, as I understand it.
The part that relates to suburban property we are willing to
accept.
Mr. Maxey: I accept the amendment of Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham: You mean to strike out the last part of your
former amendment?
Mr. Maxey: Yes, sir.
The Chairman: If there is no objection we will let it go at
that.
Mr. Leahy: I have an amendment that I want to offer and the
reason I suggest it is this: A corporation may under this sec-
tion incorporate for the business of going into farming and
for that business may acquire all the real estate it wants, and
then in the course of another year they may dispose of it if
they see fit. I want to make it read as follows: "No corpora-
tion shall engage in farming, or acquire, trade or deal in real
estate."
Mr. Swartz: Suppose for instance that an organization of capi-
tal might desire to go into the poultry business in some part
of this state, I would like to know whether property that
would come under the definition of farming?
Mr. Leahy: I think it would, yes sir.
Mr. Tenor: I would like to ask if it is the purpose of this
section to prevent corporations being organized in this state
for the purpose of engaging in the purchase and sale of farm
lands for farming, speculation and otherwise?
The Chairman: I understand that is what it means.
Mr. Tenor: I notice the section reads "no corporation shall
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receive, acquire or deal in real estate except such as shall
be necessary and proper to carry on the business for which
it was created. Under this section could not a corporation
be created for the express purpose of buying farm lands?
Mr. Leahy: My amendment covers that proposition.
The Chairman: The Leahy amendment reads as follows: Line
two, page 4, amend after the words 'shall' by inserting the
words: "No corporation shall be organized to engage in farm-
ing or acquire or deal in real estate."
Mr. Ellias: I second the amendment.
Mr. Leahy: I want to say that if I can prevent it no corpora-
tion is going to be permitted to get hold of the farm lands
of this state and prevent the individual citizens from acquiring
homesteads here.
Mr. Caudill: Is that what that means?
Mr. Leahy: Yes, sir.
Mr. Caudill: Well, I am with you.
Mr. Kornegay: Suppose two or three of these farmers want
to amalgamate their forces. Do you want to cut them off.
Mr. Ellis: Yes.
Mr. Kornegay: All right, go ahead.
President Murray: I think the more the gentlemen think of
this the more they will see the difficulty involved in this. I
tell you right now we don't want to prevent a corporation
from farming, what we want to prevent is corporations buy-
ing land and making some other fellow do the farming. You
take some industries in the way of agriculture and you can
find but few individuals that can engage in it. I have been
studying this question for years and I will tell you right now
you cannot limit a corporation without locking the wheels of
progress, without affecting the very man you intend to bene-
fit. I tell you all you can do is stop common carriers from
owning land and then prevent common carriers from acting
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as land agent and prevent all corporations from acting as
land agent in the state, then in order to reach the other cor-
portions, and the only one that is a danger, is the one that buys
for the purpose of renting it out. Now to reach the one that
buys a large body of land for the purpose of renting it out
to the farmer, while he lives in another state and have streams
of rental going out of the state, the way to do away with that
evil is to put a limit and put a graduated land tax on it. I
am going to move this as a substitute to all amendments that
"no corporation shall be chartered for the purpose of dealing
or speculating in lands or acting as land agent in this state."
In the end, Oklahoma adopted laws aimed not only at
Standard Oil but other trusts as well. The Sherman Act, it is
clear, served as a model for the men at Guthrie; the delegates,
aware of the difficulties of enforcement and investigation.
The Oklahoma Constitution went so far as to grant powers to
state officials to operate offending businesses in the name of
the state as a public trust or corporation.
GOALS and GENERAL ATTITUDES
Thus we can see the background of Oklahoma's constitu-
tional provisions regulating corporate and business activity
and determine, in part, how and why these new laws came
into being. We must note there was a remarkable balance to
th Oklahoman's efforts to arrive at a set of laws designed both
to promote business and industry and to encourage the farmer
and the laborer.
In his highly oratorical style Alfalfa Bill set the tone of
the Oklahoma Constitution when he outlined the goals of the
Convention. "Let us avoid the extremes of radical socialism on
the one side and extreme conservatism on the other, the ex-
treme of a few men owning everything on the one side and
nobody owning anything on the other. '67 Such a goal was
surely commendable. With a note of almost bitterness Murray
noted more than forty years later that the state had not
87 Murray cited in OCC PROCEEDiGs, 25.
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achieved the goals he and the others meeting in Guthrie had
dreamed might be possible. "Every clause of the Constitution,"
he argued, "should be vitalized because without 'vitalization'
the entire benefit, [of the constitution], can never be felt by
the people."68
THEME OF THE OKLAHOMA LAW
Responding to the national experience, a model and a
mirror reflecting the consequences of economic concentra-
tion, the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution sought to
create a system under which power that could affect people
would be preserved in the hands of the people. One can see,
through a careful examination of the Bill of Rights enumer-
ated in the Oklahoma Constitution, 9 that the drafters were
not content with the general expression of rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution. Alongside the basic rights of
free speech and assembly, suffrage, due process, bail, habeas
corpus, and others, the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution
also placed provisions to protect the people against excessive
encroachment of political and economic power. The first de-
fined right in the Bill of Rights is that:
All political power is inherent in the people; and gov-
ernment is instituted for their protection, security,
and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and
they have the right to alter or reform the same when-
ever the public good may require it... o
Additionally the Bill of Rights provided strong protection
against economic power. Records, books, and files of all cor-
68 MumaAy, MEMoms, II, 69.
69 Okla. Const. art. II. Under the Federal Constitution it is
the first ten amendments that are generally referred to as
the Bill of Rights. In the Oklahoma Constitution, there are
thirty-three enumerations under the classification of Bill
of Rights. The last of these, Section 33 provides that: "The
enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained
by the people."
7o Okla. Const. art. H, § 1.
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porations were made "subject to the full visitorial and inquis-
itional powers of the State."7' 1 The State retained its right
"to engage in any occupation or business for public purposes
with the exception of agriculture."7 2 Perhaps the most import-
ant protection was that:
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free government, and shall never be
allowed .... 11
The astonishing insight of the men, described by William
Jennings Bryan as the "cornfield lawyers of Oklahoma," who
drafted the early constitution is reflected in the fact that they
recognized the necessity of protecting the people against both
political and economic power. Congress in a much later study
expressed the same awareness.7 4 In a 1941 study on economic
concentration, it was observed that the first and most im-
portant tenet of a democratic society is "that all power orig-
inates in all of the people and not in any part of them, how-
ever numerous, however powerful or able, any given part
may be."75
Governments are instituted among men to serve men;
men were not created to serve government. It is not the
function of government nor of those to whom the duties and
responsibilities of government are temporarily entrusted to
direct and command the activities and the lives of men. It is
the sole function of government to produce and preserve that
order which will permit men to enjoy to the utmost that free
will with which they were endowed by an all-wise Creator.
If, however, the political organization which we call gov-
ernment is called into existence by men for the benefit of
T Okla. Const. art. II, § 28.
72 Okla. Const. art. II, § 31.
78 Okla. Const. art. II, § 32.
74 Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of
Concentration of Economic Power, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
75 Id. at 5.
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the entire community, a principle which as Americans we
must all acknowledge, it is equally true that the economic
organizations, called into existence by men to meet their ma-
terial needs, are likewise justified only to the degree in which
they serve the entire community. If the political structure is
designed to preserve the freedom of the individual, the eco-
nomic structure must not be permitted to destroy it.
Business organization, like government organization, is a
creature of man, a tool by which mankind endeavors to ad-
vance its material prospects. Like government organization,
business organization has no right or function to control the
activities and the lives of men.7 6
RADICAL OR CONSERVATIVE?
The line between radicalism and conservatism, as related
to the Oklahoma Constitution, is thin, maybe even nonexist-
ent. Nevertheless, compared to the federal laws, Oklahoma's
Constitution and early statutes went much farther in checking
political and economic power. This may cause some to refer
to the state provisions as extremely radical. Others will, how-
ever, characterize the differences and the precision of the
Oklahoma law as conservative- that is sensibly conservative.
Under our federal system, people are guaranteed the right
to petition the government for a redress or grievances.77 This
same right was inserted in the Oklahoma Constitution;7 8 how-
ever, there is also included the more direct protection of the
initiative and the referendum.7 9 No attempt will be made, in
this paper, to cover the law of the initiative and referendum
which permits the people direct participation. It is enough
that recognition be given to this check on the exercise of polit-
78 Id.
7 U. S. Const. amend. I.
78 Okla. Const. art. II, § 3.
71 Okla. Const., art. V § § 1-8. For the present laws on the
initiative and referendum, see: Okla. Stat. tit. 34, § § 1-66
(1971).
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ical power. Our principal concern will be restricted to the
controls placed on economic power.
Federal antitrust statutes and their judicial interpreta-
tions stood as a model for the drafters of the Oklahoma Con-
stitution. At the time of the Convention the only significant
federal antitrust law was the Sherman Act80 with its two basic
substantive provisions; one making contracts in restraint of
trade illegal,8 ' and the other making it illegal for any person
to monopolize.8 2 Following substantially the language of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, the drafters of the Oklahoma
Constitution provided that:
The Legislature shall define what is an unlawful com-
bination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement, in re-
straint of trade, and enact laws to punish persons
engaged in any unlawful combination, trust, act, or
agreement, in restraint of trade, or composing any
such monopoly, trust, or combination.8
More important than the federal statutory model was the
general economic experiences of the nation. Some of these
experiences were reflected in judicial opinions interpreting
the Sherman Act, and others in the experiences of neighbor-
ing states. Indicative of the general national economic ex-
perience known to the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution
is the description offered by Justice Harlan in his dissenting
opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.8 4
All who recall the condition of the country in
1890 will remember that there was everywhere, among
the people generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The
Nation had been rid of human slavery . . . but the
conviction was universal that the country was in real
danger from another kind of slavery sought to be
fastened on the American people, namely, the slavery
80 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
81 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
82 Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
83 Okla. Const. art. V, § 44.
" 221 U.S. 1, 83-84 (1911) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
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that would result from aggregations of capital in the
hands of a few individuals and corporations controll-
ing for their own profit and advantage exclusively,
the entire business of the country, including the pro-
duction and sale of the necessaries of life. Such a
danger was thought to be then imminent, and all felt
that it must be met firmly and by such statutory regu-
lations as would adequately protect the people
against oppression and wrong.
Although the Supreme Court's Standard Oil opinion was
subsequent to the Oklahoma Convention, the charges against
the Company were filed on November 15, 1960.85 The al-
leged antitrust violation of Standard Oil concerned activity
of the Company from 1870 to 1906 and included almost every
known form of anticompetitive practice, much of which was
within the personal knowledge of the men drafting the Okla-
homa Constitution. In fact, based on the history of the Con-
vention, the controls placed on economic power were prin-
cipally directed at railroads and Standard Oil.
With knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the
federal antitrust laws, the drafters of the Constitution and the
early legislators were able to approve laws that would more
effectively check the growth and exercise of economic power
in the State of Oklahoma. Much of what was done in Okla-
homa predates similar provisions subsequently passed by
Congress to supplement the Sherman Act.80 This alone shows
the foresight of the early Oklahoma law makers. But even
considering the present state of the federal antitrust laws, the
original Oklahoma Constitution and first statutes placed far
greater control on economic power. Before discussing the
81 Id. at 31.
86 To place the major pieces of legislation in the proper per-
spective: the Sherman Act was passed by Congress in 1890;
the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention was from Novem-
ber, 1906 to July, 1907; the Sherman Act was supplemented
by Congress in 1914 with passage of the Clayton Act and
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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substantive controls, it might be beneficial to consider the
significant differences between Federal and Oklahoma law.
1. Investigating Power: When the Sherman Act was
passed in 1890, primary responsibility for enforcement was
placed in the hands of the Attorney General. Yet there was no
provision for any pre-complaint investigatory power. Recog-
nizing a failure of the Sherman Act to stop the growth of
trust, Congress rejected the notion of giving to the Attorney
General any investigatory power.8 7 Instead of giving this
power to the Attorney General, Congress created and gave
broad inquisitorial powers to a Federal Trade Commission. 88
It was not until 1962 that Congress granted to the Attorney
General pre-complaint antitrust investigatory power.8 9
Drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution recognized the
need for investigation and provided that corporations at all
times were subject to the "full visitorial and inquisitorial pow-
ers of the State, notwithstanding the immunities and privileges
in the Bill of Rights secured to the persons, inhabitants, and
citizens thereof."90 Broader investigatory powers were also
given to the Corporation Commission created by the Oklahoma
87 For an example of this opposition see: 51 CONG. REc. 8845
(1914) (remarks of Mr. Covington); 51 CONG. REC. 8973,
8981 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Willis).
88 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1973).
Another reason for creating the Federal Trade Commission
was to bypass the technical and influential federal courts,
See: 51 CONG. REc. 8973 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murdock).
89 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. 1311-14 (1964). For discussion
of power of investigation, see: Symposium on Antitrust In-
vestigation and Procedure, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 49
(1965).
00 Okla. Const. art. II S 36. Section 9 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act grants to the Commission access to any
documentary evidence of any corporation being investigat-
ed. Jouett, The Inquisitorial Feature of the F.T.C. Act Vio-
lates the Federal Constitution, 2 VA. L. REV. 584 (1914);
Mueller, Access to Corporate Papers Under the F.T.C. v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
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Constitution,91 which power later became a pattern for the
United States Congress.
During the 1914 Congressional debates on the bill that
would create a Federal Trade Commission, Congressman Mur-
ray related his Oklahoma experience on the question of in-
quisitorial powers over corporations-particularly the large
corporation considered to have become impressed with a pub-
lic use. 2 Murray observed that under the present state of
federal law, you can go to the Treasury Department and get
information on banks; you can go to the Interstate Commerce
Commission and get information on railroads; but, "you can-
not go anywhere and get official information concerning the
operations of the Standard Oil Corporation or its allied con-
cerns.
93
Defending the creation of a Commission with inquisitorial
powers patterned after the Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sion, Murray pointed out that: "you may rest assured that
these corporations will not give you any information except
that which they want to give you, unless you compel them
to do it."94 According to Murray, it would be "absurd to think
that we can wisely legislate for corporation or farmer, for
banker or merchant unless we have all the facts about his
conditions."'0 5
Our Commission in Oklahoma can walk into any rail-
road office at any moment and say, "Open up your
books: let me see your records." And they do not
hesitate to obey. 0
It was strongly believed by Murray that this same scope
91 Okla Const. art. 9, § 18.
92 51 CONG. REc. 9050 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Morgan); 51
CONG. REC. 9052 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murray).
93 51 CONG. REC. 8993 (1914).
94 Id. at 8993.
O5 Id. at 9053.
98 Id.
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of inquisitorial power should be placed in a Federal Commis-
sion.9 7
We howl on every stump about the Standard Oil
Trust, and yet there is to be found nowhere in any
governmental or State records any records to deter-
mine anything about their business. And yet they go
into the midcontinental oil field of Kansas, Oklahoma,
and elsewhere where the independent oil operators
are at work, and, under the plea that there is over-
production destroy the independent operators and
take possession of their property.
We ought to have the information that will determine
the amount of the output of the crude product, of the
refined product, of the demand each year of the coun-
try and of the world at large, so that we may deter-
mine on any day what is the output and determine
with certainty whether there is an overproduction or
whether this is but a plea of that trust to rob the
people of their property. This commission seeks to do
that; but it is powerless to do it unless you give the
power to the commission itself.98
Following the debates, Congress did create the Federal Trade
Commission, and vested that agency with investigatory pow-
ers as broad if not broader than the powers of the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission.9
17 It should be noted that at this point of the debates, the
form of the Commission to be created had not been final-
ized. References made to the Federal Trade Commission,
which was the final form, is only for convenience and
clarity. There is no effort made to trace the history of the
creation of this agency. The debates are used only for what
value they may have on the history of Oklahoma's controls
on economic power.
08 51 CoNG. REc. 9053 (1914). That the power be given to the
Commission itself, was an indictment of the federal judici-
ary. Murray expressed absolutely no confidence in inferior
Federal judges making a reference to them that would
shock any person sensitive to civil rights. 51 CONG. REC.
9053 (1914)..... ....
01 See note 90, supra.
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2. Regulation of Corporations: During the Oklahoma Con-
stitutional Convention, Murray declared in his opening address
that: "We must shut our ears to the clamor of 'Special Inter-
est' and corporate graft and greed," and "conserve the public
interest in every way possible."'00 One instrument created to
protect the public interest against economic power was the
Corporation Commission. This Commission was granted power
and authority for "supervising, regulating, and controlling all
transportation and transmission companies doing business in
this State, in all matters relating to the performance of their
public duties."'' 1
Although the Corporation Commission was principally
concerned with transportation and transmission companies,
the Oklahoma Constitution defined the term "Company" to
include any company having "power or privileges not pos-
sessed by individuals."'0 2 This power of the Corporation Com-
mission over what might include all corporations becomes
significant when considered in light of an early legislative
sanction against monopolies.
The Oklahoma Constitution required the Legislature to
define an unlawful combination, monopoly, or agreement in
restraint of trade, and to enact sanctions. 0 3 In response to
this mandate and utilizing the power of the Corporation Com-
mission, the Legislature enacted a law defining and control-
ling a "public business."
Whenever any business, by reason of its nature,
extent, or the existence of a virtual monopoly therein,
is such that the public must use the same ,or its ser-
vices, or the consideration by it given or taken or
offered, or the commodities bought or sold therein are
offered or taken by purchase or sale in such a manner
as to make it of public consequence or to affect the
community at large as to supply demand or price or
100 See note 90 supra.
101 Okla. Const. art. 9, § 18.
102 Okla. Const. art. 9 § 18 (b).
103 Okla. Const. art. 5, § 44.
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rate thereof, or said business is conducted in viola-
tion of the first section of this article, said business is
a public business, and subject to be controlled by the
State, by the Corporation Commission or by an action
in any district court of the State, as to all of its prac-
tices, prices, rates and charges. And it is hereby de-
clared to be the duty of any person, firm or corpora-
tion engaged in any public business to render its
services and offer its commodities, or either, upon
reasonable terms without discrimination and ade-
quately to the needs of the public, considering the
facilities of said business.104
Congressman Morgan, a Republican from Oklahoma,
strongly defended the idea of the "public business" as adopted
by the Oklahoma Legislature. According to Morgan, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ought to be granted similar powers. 0 5
It was argued that "there is a limit to the power that can be
safely intrusted to an industrial corporation, and we must
restrict that power, or exercise governmental control over
their charges and prices."'01 6 Continuing, Morgan argued that:
Many of our industrial corporations have become im-
pressed with a public use. They are public agencies.
They are in every legitimate sense of the word quasi
public corporations, and we should by law declare
them to be such.10 7
Congress did not adopt any provision that would require
104 Okla. R. L. 1910, § 8235. The first section of this article,
made reference to, provided that: "Every Act, agreement,
contract, or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this
state, which is against public policy, is hereby declared to
be illegal." Okla. R. L. 1910, sec. 8220. Section 8235 is now
found at Okla. Stat. tit. 79, § 4 (1971).
105 51 CONG. REc. 6171 (1914).
10651 Cong. Rec. 1871 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Morgan).
107 51 CoNG. Ec. 1872 (1914). For additional comments on this
sub.*ect by Mr. Morgan, see: 51 CoNG. REc. 1868-1871 (1914);
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direct governmental control on corporations that violated the
antitrust laws or that, because of their nature, became im-
pressed with a public use.10 8 On the other hand, Oklahoma
did. As indicated above, the Oklahoma Legislature provided
that under certain defined circumstances a corporation would
be determined to be a "public business" and subject to con-
trols as "to all of its practices, prices, rates and charges."'0
Under the "public business" statute, a corporation could
become subject to control if it "has its property in such a
position that the public has become interested in its use, and
such business is conducted in violation of" the section de-
fining certain anticompetitive and monopolistic practices. 110
In Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love," the Oklahoma Cor-
poration Commission has limited rates for laundry work in
Oklahoma City after finding and declaring the Oklahoma
Operating Company a monopoly and its business a public
one.112 The order of the Corporation Commission was reversed
by the Supreme Court, but only for the reason that there was
inadequate judicial review of laundry rates set by the Com-
missionl.13
Corporations need not be found to constitute an unlawful
trust before becoming subject to control and regulation un-
der the Oklahoma "public business" statute." 4 The statute
108 Congress has, however, been aware of the possible future
need of a governmnt takeover of corporations if the trend
toward economic concentration continued unchecked. 95
CONG. REc. 11498 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Patman); 95 CONG.
REc. 11497 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs); 95 CONG. REC.
(remarks of Mr. Celler).
109 Note 104, supra.
110 Oklahoma Gin Co. v State, 63 Okla. 10, 158 P. 629, 630
(1916), rev'd on procedural grounds, 252 U.S. 339 (1920).
111252 U.S. 331 (1920).
112 Id. at 333.
113 Id. at 337.
114 Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 96
Okla. 19, 23, 220 P. 54, 57 (1923).
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provides for the regulation of any business, which, by reason
of its nature and extent, or in event of a virtual monopoly
therein, is such that the public must use the same."115 A nar-
row and strict reading of the "public business" statute, in
James v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.,116 might make this stat-
ute far less significant as a control of economic power.
In the James case, decided in 1937, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's petition was defective because it failed to
show that the public must use the defendant's business; that
the defendant's alleged wrongful acts affect the community
at large; or that defendants business is conducted as an un-
lawful trust."17 As will be indicated from a review of this
problem, as well as other statutory provisions dealing with
trusts and monopolies, the courts have become stricter and
moved substantially farther from the standards set by the
drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution and the early legisla-
tors.
The important thing about the historical account of Okla-
homa's early controls of economic power is still the giant steps
taken ahead of the federal antitrust program. Had the Okla-
homa Courts remained closer to the Constitutional and stat-
utory history, a declaration that corporation was a "public
business" would have offered substantial protection to the
people. Courts have the power to declare that a corporation
is a public business; this is a judicial function recognized in
the statute as well as judicial opinions.1 8
115 Id. There is a major difference between the word monopoly
and the acts going to make up an unlawful trust. A com-
pany can have a monopoly without any wrongdoing. In
the Oklahoma Light case, the company was the only ice
distributing company in the area. Id. at 22, 220 P. at 56.
116 181 Okla. 54, 72 P.2d 495 (1937).117 Id. at 56, 72 P.2d at 497.
118 OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8235. Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 96 Okl. 19, 23, 220 P. 54, (1923). De-
termination of reasonable rates is a legislative function
within the power of the Corporation Commission.
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3. Refusal to deal: What it means when a corporation is
declared to be a "public business" by the court or the Cor-
poration Commission is that the corporation must "render its
services and offer its commodities or either upon reasonable
terms without discrimination and adequately to the needs of
the public, considering the facilities of said business."'1 " This
can reasonably be interpreted to mean that a "public busi-
ness" cannot refuse to "render its services and offer its com-
modities." It would also mean that these services and com-
modities must be furnished at reasonable prices without dis-
crinination.120
There appears to be no conditions under which a "pub-
lic business" could discriminate in price. Price discrimination,
without regard to a "public business," was made unlawful
"if the effect or intent thereof is to establish or maintain a
virtual monopoly hindering competition, or restriction of
trade."'1  The "public business" provisions presented a sub-
stantial difference between Oklahoma and the federal anti-
trust provisions. There is even a greater departure if the Okla-
homa "public business" could not exercise a long recognized
federal freedom to select its own customers. 122
4. Labor exemption: During the formative years of fed-
eral antitrust philosophy, the Sherman Act was an ineffective
weapon against the abuses of economic power. This basic anti-
119 OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8235.
120 This might explain why the court in James v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co, 181 Okla. 54, 72 P.2d 495 (1937) declined
to rule that the Oklahoma Natural Gas Company was a
"public business."
121 OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8227.
122 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). These cases
recognize a clear right of a seller to refuse to deal with any
customer. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13, also has the specific provisions: "That nothing herein
shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own custo-
mers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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trust statute was however a forceful weapon frequently used
against organized labor.123 As a result of this double stand-
ard - one for labor and one for trusts - there was a vindic-
tive attack upon the federal courts. Congressman Graham
reasoned that:
The accurate struggle between organized wealth and
organized labor has found its way to the courts, and
there is some reason for believing that the courts,
and more especially the Federal courts, consciously
or unconsciously, have leaned too much to the side
of organized wealth, to the side of property.12 4
Courts, allowing the use of "midnight labor injunctions," were
charged with being "petty judicial tyrants." It was urged that
Congress force the courts to respond to all the people and
not to the privileged few.1 25
Congress responded in 1914 to the judicially created im-
balance of power between organized labor and organized
wealth by enacting in the Clayton Act an exemption from
the antitrust laws for labor organizations. 126 Through the. proc-
ess of strict judicial interpretation, however, this antitrust
exemption for labor was effectively eliminated.127 Finally,
Congress in 1932 passed the Norris-La Guardia Act which re-
moved most of the power of federal courts to issue labor in-
junctions.1 28 The need for this drastic Congressional action
caused Senator Wagner to observe that such need "reflects no
glory upon American jurisprudence.' 129
12 51 Cong. Rec. 13847 (1914); 51 Cong. Rec. 9173 (1914)-For
the few cases filed against economic trusts up to 1914, there
had been 101 antitrust cases filed against farmers' and labor
organizations.
124 51 CONG. REc. 9250 (1914).
125 51 CONG. REc. 9559 (1914).
126 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1971)).
127 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
128 Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at
29 U.S.C. 101 (1971)).
129 75 CONG. REc. 4915 (1932).
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Oklahoma's Constitution and early statutes were written
with a clear purpose of retaining an agrarian concept built
upon small family farms, and of protecting the rights of labor.
The agrarian and labor influence can be seen from the com-
position of the State seal. Included in the seal are the words
"Labor Omnia Vincit" and the symbol showing a sheaf of
wheat and a plow.10 In the Constitutional Bill of Rights, it
was also provided that: "All persons have the inherent right
to . . . the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry."'131
Labor's exemption from the antitrust laws in Oklahoma
was recognized and upheld in State v. Coyle,13 2 a case decided
in 1912. Judge Doyle, writing the first opinion in this case,
measured the labor exemption on the basis of an equal pro-
tection argument - that if organized wealth is subject to anti-
trust laws, organized labor must likewise be so subjected. It
was stated that:
The character of the rights guaranteed to employees
under this section is not to be tested according to
the standards adopted in other countries in former
times, where labor partook of many of the disabilities
of selfdom and peonage. But it is to be judged by the
more enlightened conceptions of the present, when
the dignity of labor is recognized, and where the equal
right of all men to life, liberty, and pursuit of hap-
piness is guaranteed by the fundamental law of a free
country. 33
Oklahoma's respect for labor over wealth and economic
power was expressed in terms even more glowing by Judge
Furman who wrote the second opinion in State v. CoyZe. 134 A
lengthy quote from this opinion will help to measure the
temperament of Oklahoma's early law makers and judges.
180 OHLA. CONST. art. 6, § 35.
181 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
132 7 Okla. Crim. 50, 122 P. 243 (1912), rehearing denied, 8 Okla.
Crim. 686, 130 P. 316 (1913).
133 7 Okla. Crim. at 89, 122 P. at 260.
14 8 Okla. Crim. 686, 130 P. 316 (1913).
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The assumption of counsel for appellees is that the
rights of capital are equal to the rights of labor. Good
morals do not sustain this assumption. While labor
and capital are both entitled to the protection of the
law, it is not true that the abstract rights of capital
are equal to those of labor, and that they both stand
upon an equal footing before the law. Labor is nat-
ural; capital is artificial. Labor was made by God:
capital is made by man. Labor is not only blood and
bone, but it also has a mind and a soul, and is ani-
mated by sympathy, hope, and love; capital is inani-
mate, soulless matter. Labor is the creator; capital is
the creature. If all the capital in the world were de-
stroyed, a great injury would thereby be inflicted up-
on the entire human race; but the bright minds, the
brave hearts, and the strong arms of labor would in
time create new capital, and thus the injury would
be ultimately cured. If all of the labor on earth was
destroyed, capital would lose its value and become
absolutely worthless. The strength and glory of this
country lies, not in its vast accumulations of capital,
but it depends upon the arms that labor, the minds
that think, and the hearts that feel. Labor is always
a matter of necessity. Capital is largely a matter of
luxury. Labor has been dignified by the example of
God. The Savior of mankind was called the "car-
penter's son." We are told in the Bible that "the love
of money is the root of all evil." This statement is
confirmed by the entire history of the human race.
The love of money is the cause of the organization
of trusts and monopolies. With what show of reason
and justice, therefore, can the advocates of monopoly
be heard to say that capital is the equal of labor?
But if we concede that the assumption of counsel for
appellees is well founded, and if we arbitrarily and
in disregard of good morals place capital and labor
upon an absolute equality before the law, another
difficulty confronts them. Capital organizes to accom-
plish its purposes. Then, according to their own logic,
it would be a denial of equal rights to labor to deny
to it the right to organize and act without a breach
of the peace to meet the aggressions of capital.135
H5 Id. at 695-96, 130 P. at 320.
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The articulation of Judge Furman, predates the Congres-
sional oratory found in the 1914 and 1932 Congressional Rec-
ord. As indicated in these debates, timid and biased judges
were principally responsible for the plight of the working
man. This judicial prejudice, which Senator Wagner said "re-
flects no glory upon American jurisprudence,"130 was identi-
fied and criticized by Oklahoma's Judge Furman. He stated
that: "[I]t is a fact well known to the legal profession and
to the country, that many of our appellate courts, both state
and federal, have in the past been largely dominated by men,
who, before their elevation to the bench and while they were
practicing lawyers, were more or less under monopolistic in-
fluences."137
Judge Furman, critical of those Judges influenced by
monopolies and describing such judges as being exceedingly
dangerous, continued by saying that:
It is no secret that corporations and monopolies are
active and tireless in their efforts to secure control
of the appellate courts of this country and thereby
by judicial construction defeat the will of the people
as expressed in legislation. As these influences are
powerful and well organized, they often succeed in
securing the election or appointment of judges who
are under obligations to them for past favors. This
evil has been carried to such an extent and has be-
come so open and notorious that many good people
have almost lost hope and have largely ceased to
have confidence in the fairness, impartiality, and in-
tegrity of the courts where corporations, trust, and
monopolies are concerned. This constitutes one of the
most alarming conditions now existing in America.
A judge may desire to be entirely honest, yet if he
is under influences which are antagonistic to t h e
rights of the people, he will make an exceedingly
dangerous judge. We are repeatedly told in the Biblethat "a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise and per-
vert the words of the righteous."... So we have the
136 75 CONG. REc. 4915 (1932).
137 State v. Coyle, 8 Okla. Crim. 686, 687, 130 P. 316 (1913).
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highest possible authority for the statement that, al-
though a judge may ordinarily be a wise and right-
eous man, yet, if he has been the recipient of favors
at the hands of trusts and monopolies, he cannot safe-
ly be relied upon to reach just and correct conclusions
in cases where their interests are involved, and that
in such cases his eyes may become blind to the rights
of the people and his judgment may become pervert-
ed without his being aware of the fact. It may not
be popular in some circles to say this, but we be-
lieve that it is the absolute truth and that this is the
main cause of the manifest bias of many of our courts
against all anti-trust legislation. 13 8
Mistakes made by Congress in drafting antitrust legisla-
tion was a lesson to the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion. Many of the deficiencies in the federal system were
avoided in Oklahoma because these men had available to
them "the American experience." Taking advantage of their
time in history, the law makers set a standard that could be
fairly understood by the judges who interpret the law.
LOCAL CONTROL
Preservation of local control over the exercise of economic
power formed the basis for most of Oklahoma's antitrust laws.
From federal experiences, it was thought that political power
would be seriously dissipated, perhaps even surrended, to pri-
vate economic forces unless adequate controls were enacted.18 9
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States,140 involving
the consolidation of previously independent railroad lines, the
Court ruled that: "The mere existence of such a combination
and the power acquired . . . constitute a menace to, and a
restraint upon, the freedom of commerce which Congress in-
tended to recognize and protect."'41 Justice Harlan, writing
188 Id. at 687-88, 130 P. at 316-17.
188 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
140 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
14 1 1d. at 327.
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for the Court, observed that unless such combination is de-
stroyed "the entire commerce of [an] immense territory . . .
will be at the mercy of a single holding corporation, organiz-
ed in a state distant from the people of that territory."142
Local control, according to Justice Harlan, was essential for
maintaining a vigorous system of free competition.
As local control is destroyed, corporate management has
less concern for the people in local communities. Leadership
is destroyed, charity is reduced, and relationships become im-
personal.143 The authors of Middletown in Transition describ-
ed the loss of local control as follows:
Every American city has its successful businessmen,
but the American success story has been kaleidosopic
in recent years. Local giants, the boys who h a v e
grown up with the town and made good, have shrunk
in stature as rapid technological changes, the heavy
capital demands of nation-wide distribution, and shifts
in the strategic centers for low-cost production in a
national market have undercut their earlier advant-
ages of location, priority in the field, or energy; and
as Eastern capital has advantages of location, priority
in the field, or energy; and as Eastern capital has
forced them out or brought them out and reduced
them to the status of salaried men, or retired them
outright in favor of imported management.144
Looking at the American experience at a later date which
evidenced a failure to preserve local control, a Congressional
study released in 1941 reveals that "mayors of great cities,
and governors of great states, have been forced to look to
Washington and the federal government for solutions of local
problems. The reason: "the control of even local economic
activity had been removed from within the borders of their
respective communities."'145 "Local communities an d local
142 1d. at 327-328.
143 J. UDELL, SocIL AND EcoNomic CONSEQUENCES OF THE MER-
GER MovEmENT IN WiscoNsiN (1969).
144 R. L=m & H. Lym, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION 76 (1937).
145 TNEC study, supra note 74 at 6,
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sovereignties" first became "dependent upon centralized eco-
nomic organization; they were then out of necessity forced
into being "dependent upon centralized political organiza-
tion."146
Oklahoma has not been spared this dependency upon cen-
tralized economic and centralized political organization. It is
common knowledge that foreign based corporations have been
permitted to gain control of local based corporations. 14 Loss
of local control over the states economic resources has not
been the result of a lack of laws. In an effort to avoid large
foreign corporations from coming into Oklahoma and gaining
control over the state's economic resources, definite controls
were incorporated in the constitution and early statutes.
Failure of these early laws to achieve the goals of the
drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution was noted by Alfalfa
Bill Murray in his autobiography written more than forty
years after the Constitutional Convention.'48 Murray argued
that: "Every clause of the Constitution should be vitalized
because without 'vitalization' the entire benefit can never be
felt by the people."'4 9 Vigorous enforcement of the Constitu-
tional and statutory controls on economic power would have
prevented the wealth of the State from becoming so concen-
trated into the hands of so few people.
The drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution incorporated
an absolute prohibition against the consolidation of public
service corporations having parallel or competing lines, "ex-
cept by enactment of the Legislature upon the recommenda-
146 Id.
,17 There is not enough space to list all the local companies
that have been acquired by corporations based outside of
the State. But see: Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp.
1095 (1971); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727
10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
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tion of the Corporation Commission."'u 0 Railroad, transporta-
tion, or transmission companies organized under the laws of
Oklahoma were prohibited (without exception) from consoli-
dating "by private or judicial sale, or otherwise" with any
such companies organized under the laws of any other state. 15
Corporations licensed to do business in the State of Olda-
homa were even prohibited from owning, holding or controll-
ing, in any manner whatever, the stock of any "competitive
corporation or corporations engaged in the same kind of busi-
ness, in or out of the state."' 52 The penalty for holding stock
in violation of the provision was the forfeiture of the cor-
porate charter or license to do business in the State, and a
penalty in the form of a fine recovered at the suit of the
State in any Court of competent jurisdiction. 5 3
Other controls on economic power prohibited aliens who
were not bona fide residents of Oklahoma from acquiring title
to or owning any land in this State. 5 4 The Constitution also
provided that no corporation could be created or licensed for
the purpose of buying, acquiring, trading or dealing in real
estate located outside the limits of towns and cities.'5 Cor-
porations were further prohibited from buying, acquiring,
trading, or dealing in real estate except as such may be nec-
1'0 OLA. CoxsT. art. IX, § 8.
P' OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 9. This section was subsequently
amended in 1913.
'
5 2 OHLA. CONST. art. IX, § 41. One limited exception to this
was that stock could be held as a bona fide pledge to indebt-
edness and acquired through foreclosure. But the stock must
be disposed of within 12 months. During the period held,
there could be no participation in business of the corpor-
ation.
153 OxLA. R. L. 1910, § 8233, as amended, OKLA. STAT. tit. 79,
§ 31 (1971). These provisions prohibiting stock ownership
go much farther than the Federal statute. Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1971).
14 OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 1.
15 OKLA. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
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essary and proper for carrying on the business for which it
is chartered or licensed 56
In 1969, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that cor-
porations could acquire and own land used for the purpose
of farming.1 7 At first glance, this holding of the Supreme
Court appears to be contrary to the Constitutional provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring real estate. An ex-
amination of the constitutional history of this section, how-
ever, reveals only a strong feeling against ownership and the
absolute prohibition was never adopted.' 8
From the constitutional history of the prohibition of cor-
porate land ownership, one sees the desire to preserve and
encourage individually owned and operated family-styled
farms. There was a fear that corporations, if allowed to acquire
land, would be able to use their economic resources to pre-
clude individual land ownership.19 Mr. R. L. Williams had
in the Convention, urged that: "If we don't prevent corpora-
tions from acquiring farm lands in the Indian Territory you
are going to make it hard for farmers to buy a home."'1 0 To
make it absolutely clear, Mr. Leaky offered an amendment
to the Constitutional land proposition that: "No corporation
shall engage in farming, or acquire, trade or deal in real es-
tate.'161 President Murray opposed this amendment, stating
that "I tell you right now we can't want to prevent a corpora-
tion from farming, what we want to prevent is corporations
buying land and making some other fellow do the farming."'16 2
The final draft of the Constitution did not include any
explicit prohibition against corporations owning land for the
156 Id.
' ' Le Force v. Bullard, 454 P. 2d 297 (Okla. 1969).
158 For the Constitutional history, see notes 154-56 supra.
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purpose of farming. It was so held in the LeForce case.16 Re-
sponding to this judicial decision, the Oklahoma Legislature,
during its 1971 session, enacted strong restrictions on farming
corporations. 164 This action of the 1971 Oklahoma Legislature
accomplished the basic purposes and policies of the earlier
Constitutional Convention.165
CONTROL OF MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES
Standard Oil, and its monopoly control over the oil in-
dustry, was one of the main targets of the drafters of the
Oklahoma Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution as
adopted was aimed at all trusts and anticompetitive practices.
In the Bill of Rights, monopolies were declared to be "con-
trary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be
allowed."'166 The Legislature was directed to: "define what is
an unlawful combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement,
in restraint of trade."'167 Besides this general direction for the
Legislature, the Convention also included a specific prohibi-
tion against price discrimination. 16 8
Responding to its Constitutional mandate, the Oklahoma
Legislature provided that: "Every act, agreement, contract, or
combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce within this state, which is
16 Leforce v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969).
:6 OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 951-54 (1971).
165 Foreign Corporations are prohibited absolutely from farm-
ing. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 951 (1971). Domestic corporations
formed for this purpose are greatly restricted so as to elim-
inate principally all but the family farm. The intent ex-
pressed in the bill is that "it is the considered judgment of
the Oklahoma State Senate that the widespread use of
rural Oklahoma lands by publicly held corporation is not
in the best interest of this state." S. Res. 67, 33d Legis., 1st
Sess., Okla. Laws 1055 (1971).
166 OILA. CONST. art. II, : 32.
167 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 44.
168 OKLA. Cost. art. IX, § 45.
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against public policy, is hereby declared to be illegal."16 9 This
is almost a verbatim reproduction of the Sherman Act, but
with two significant differences.170 With the word "act" in-
cluded in the Oklahoma statute, the state law is far broader
than the federal Sherman Act. Under the Oklahoma law, it
would appear that an "act" short of an agreement or com-
bination could be declared illegal if in restraint of trade.
The other difference between this statute and the Sher-
man Act reduced the scope of the Oklahoma statute. Every
contract in restraint of trade is, by the Sherman Act, declared
to be illegal.1 7 1 According to the Oklahoma statute, the con-
tract in restraint of trade was declared illegal on the condi-
tion that it be found to be against public policy. This defi-
ciency in the early statute was corrected by the 1971 Okla-
homa Legislature. By amendment, this section now declares
that contracts in restraint of trade are against public policy
and illegal. 7 2
To supplement or strengthen the basic section of the Okla-
homa antitrust statute, the Legislature adopted a section more
definitive of combinations in restraint of trade. 7 3 Section 8232
of the 1910 Revised Laws made it unlawful for any corpora-
tion to issue or own trust certificates, or to enter into any
agreement with other corporations for the purpose or effect
to place control of the corporations in the hands of any trust
or trustees, holding corporation or association with the intent
or affect of limiting or fixing prices, lessen production or
sale.174 Any person entering into this type of trust agreement
169 Okla. R. L. 1910, § 8220, as amended OKLA. STAT. tit. 79 § 1
(1971).
170 Compare the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1971).
171 This absolute prohibition must of course be read in light of
the judicially created rule of reason. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).172 OIKA. STAT. tit. 79, § 1 (1971).
17 OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8232, OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 3 (1971).
174 Id. This section was aimed at the practices of Standard Oil
Co., see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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would be deemed guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade;
however, it was provided, "that this section shall not be con-
strued to extend beyond the scope of meaning of the first
section of this article."175
Price discrimination between different persons, or differ-
ent sections, communities or cities of the state is prohibited
"if the effect or intent thereof is to establish or maintain a
virtual monopoly hindering competition, or restriction of
trade.' 76 This was the only statutory prohibition against price
discrimination as of 1910, and was, it would appear, princi-
pally aimed at monopolistic practice although the statute did
reach price discrimination that restricted trade. Subsequently,
the Legislature enacted more comprehensive laws to define
and provide remedies for price discrimination.177
Instead of a comprehensive review of the statutes, it
might be more suitable for purposes of this paper to review
the judicial attitude toward the Oklahoma controls on eco-
nomic power. There are actually only a few cases in which
the Oklahoma court has shown a strong inclination to vigor-
ously enforce the State antitrust laws. It is of some interest
also that the cases in which the alleged restraint was found
and condemned all predate the year 1923.178
If it is true that contemporaneous exposition is the best
', Reference here is to OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8220, as amended
OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 1 (1971).
17 6 OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8227.
177 These laws now appear at: OKLA. STAT. tit. 79 §§ 2, 81-87
(1971). See, Western Lumber Co. v. State, 17 Okla. Crim.
427, 189 P. 868 (1920); Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum
Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
907 (1957).
178 State v. Coyle, 7 Okla. Crim. 50, 122 P. 243 (1912), rehearing
denied, 8 Okla. Crim, 686, 130 P. 316 (1913); Oklahoma Gin
Co. v. State, 63 Okla. 10, 158 P. 629 (1916), reversed on pro-
cedural grounds, 252 U.S. 339 (1920); Oklahoma Light &
Power Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 96 Okla. 19, 220 P. 54
(1923). This is not intended to be an exhaustive list.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
64
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss2/2
CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
and strongest in the law,179 these pre 1923 explanations, being
closer to the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, should of-
fer the best evidence as to the meaning of the Constitution
and early statutes. In State v. Coyle, the defendants, operators
of cotton gins, were indicted for violation of the antitrust
laws.180 The indictment charged the defendants with monopo-
lizing the cotton market in Logan County, Oklahoma. About
90% of the cotton gins operating in the county has been
brought under the control of these defendants. 181
The trial court had sustained a demurrer to the indict-
ment against Coyle, thus the only issues directly involved at
the appellate level were the constitutionality of the antitrust
laws and the sufficiency of the indictment. 8 2 After upholding
the constitutionality of the statutes and the sufficiency of
the indictment, the court, in a separate opinion handed down
nearly one year later, denied the defendants motion for a
rehearing.'83 It is in this second opinion that one is able to
measure the judicial temperament toward the state antitrust
laws.
It is difficult to say for certain that the appellate court
was taking aim at the trial judge who had earlier sustained
the demurrer to the indictment, The court did openly observe
that many people were losing hope and confidence in the
courts's impartiality and integrity where corporate monopo-
listic practices are involved. 84 A serious question was raised
about the integrity of existing judicial precedent that had
flowed from courts influenced or dominated by trusts and
monopolies. 8 5
170 Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege.
180 State v. Coyle, 7 Okla. Crim. 50, 521, 122 P. 243 (1912).
181 Id. at 53, 122 P. at 244.
182 Emphasis was placed on the argument that the antitrust
statutes to which labor was exempted violated the equal
protection clause.
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"[T]rusts and monopolies," it was observed, "always se-
cure the services of the best lawyers obtainable who have the
ability to make the worse appear to be the better cause;"
consequently, the court was "not surprised at the number and
respectability of the authorities supporting the contentions
of" Corporate Counsel. 86 To follow the common law precedent
urged upon the court would make it impossible to "reach and
destroy conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce.' 187
A technical approach to the state antitrust laws would, ac-
cording to the court, have the effect of deciding that:
In the State of Oklahoma trusts and monopolies are
practically above and superior to the law, and that
they may at pleasure through their combinations and
conspiracies grind the people like grain beneath the
upper and nether stone, take from the mouth of labor
the bread which it has earned, and divert the stream
of wealth produced by hard and honest toil from its
rightful channels and pour it into the undeserved and
already overflowing coffers of the few. 88
Against the constitutional attack of "void for uncertain-
ty," the court observed that the Legislature did not intend
for there to be a fixed definition of trusts and monopolies.
Such a fixed meaning would have simply permitted the cor-
poration to shape its business practice so as to place it neatly
outside the fixed definition. The court noted that this strict
practice would have no doubt been "very gratifying to those
persons engaged in such unlawful undertakings. 189
The only way in which they can be reached is by
general definitions and the doctrine of a liberal con-
struction of penal statutes, and that is just what we
have in Oklahoma; hence the law is going to be en-
forced and those gentlemen must either abstain from
their illegal conduct or suffer the consequences. 00
186 Id.
187 Id. at 689, 130 P. at 317.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 693, 130 P. at 319.
190 Id. at 694, 130 P. at 319.
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By giving the statutes a liberal construction and through
a policy of vigorous enforcement, the concentration of eco-
nomic power, so much feared at the Oklahoma Constitutional
Convention, could be avoided. There was, during the early
stages of Oklahoma's history, evidence of both. In Oklahoma
Gin Co. v. State,'9" the defendant, ginning companies operating
at Chandler, Oklahoma, were charged by t h e Corporation
Commission with forming an unlawful combination in re-
straint of trade by fixing prices for ginning cotton.192 Enter-
ing an order of guilty against the companies charged, the Cor-
poration Commission declared the companies to be a "public
business" subject to the regulations of that agency.193 To be
declared a "public business," it was enough that the Corpora-
tion Commission show that the public had become interested
in its use, and that the businesses were guilty of an unlawful
combination in restraint of trade.194
One line of Oklahoma antitrust cases involve attacks on
the exercise of governmental power instead of on business
practices that restrain trade. 95 "It is aximotic that the anti-
191 63 Okla. 10, 158 P. 629 (1916), reversed on procedural
grounds, 252 U.S. 339 (1920).
1092 Id. at 10, 158 P. at 630.
103 Id. Discussion of "public business" as device to control
economic power is in text accompanying notes 100-149 supra.
104 63 Okla. at 11, 158 P. at 630. See, Oklahoma Operating Co.
v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Oklahoma Light & Power Co.
v. Corporaton Comm'n, 96 Okla. 19, 220 P. 54 (1923). Com-
pare James v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 181 Okla. 54, 72
P.2d 495 (1937); Consumers Light & Power Co. v. Phipps,
120 Okla. 223, 251 P. 63 (1926).
11 Burns v. City of Enid, 92 Okla. 67, 217 P. 1038 (1923), in-
volving exclusive permit to gather garbage; Rice v. State,
108 Okla. 4, 232 P. 807 (1925), use of convict labor to make
shirts; Schwarze v. Clark, 188 Okla. 217, 107 P.2d 1018
(1940), challenge to state licensing of barbers that provided
that student barbers could not charge for their work;
Sparks v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 283, 115 P.2d 277 (1941),
challenge of state regulating setting minimum prices for
barbers; Cotton Club v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 195 Okla.
19731
67
Strickland and Thomas: Most Sensibly Conservative and Safely Radical: Oklahoma's Constit
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1973
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
trust laws were directed at business not at the government.1 00
There may be times when the exercise of power does not ap-
pear to be legitimate state police power which could make
the practices involved subject to the federal antitrust laws.
The rule seems to depend on whether the state is actually
making the decision, or authorizes private groups to make
the decision that restrains trade. The former would be exempt;
the latter would not.167
The more relevant line of Oklahoma cases for purposes
of the article involves serious restrictions on the scope of the
antitrust laws. In Delk v. City National Bank of Duncan,198 the
antitrust claim was raised as a defense in an action filed by
bank to recover on two promissory notes.06 The contract com-
plained of, according to the court, was nothing more than a
contract to sell 60 furnaces at $2.25 each. It was noted that
the contract restricted the sales to one specified county.200
This was not considered to be an unlawful restraint. How-
ever, it was further urged that there was an oral agreement
that required the defendant to sell the furnaces for $5.75. Be-
403, 158 P.2d 707 (1945), challenge to state regulation re-
quiring persons engaged in abstract business to have ade-
quate equipment; Public Serv. Co. v. Caddo Elec. Coop.,
479 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1971), state regulation of installation of
electric power lines.
190 ABA, ANTITRUST DEVELoPMENTS 1955-1968, at 211 (1968).
1971d. at 67 (Supp. 1972).
198 85 Okla. 238, 205 P. 753 (1922).
199 Id. at 238, 205 P. at 753. See also Thomas v. Belcher, 184
Okla. 410, 87 P.2d 1084 (1939); Thomas v. Blaylock, 187
Okla. 258, 102 P.2d 585 (1940). Under federal law, the Su-
preme Court has separated commercial action to collect
debts from antitrust claims. Bruce's Juices v. American Can
Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). But see: OKLA. R. L. 1910, § 8239,
79 OKLA. STAT. 1971, § 35.
200 85 Okla. at 239, 205 P. at 754. It took the Supreme Court
until 1967 to make this type of vertical restraint clearly il-
legal. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
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cause there was a written contract, however, this evidence
was rejected as evidence of a restraint of trade.201
Since the Delk case, decided in 1922, the Oklahoma Court
has moved farther away from the liberal construction of the
antitrust laws advocated by earlier courts. Without any clear
reasoning, the court in State v. William Cameron & Co. 202 re-
jected antitrust and unfair competition charges that the de-
fendant company and others had conspired to destroy com-
petition in the lumber business.203 The court simply stated
that:
The evidence shows conditions existing to be rather
the result of an excess in number of those engaged
in the lumber and building materials field in Altus
which by reason of legitimate competition reacted to
lowering the cost therefor to the people purchasing
this merchandise in that city.204
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 1935, avoided what later
developed into a serious federal antitrust problem by ruling
that enforcement of the civil provisions of the Antitrust laws
was left exclusively to the State Attorney General. In State
v. Griffith,205 the county attorney initiated a civil antitrust
suit against the defendants- charging the defendants with
entering into:
An agreement and combination within the State of
Oklahoma to drive out all competition to them in
the moving picture business in cities and towns in
which they owned or operated theaters, and that A.
B. Momand who owned a number of theaters in the
state, had been driven out of business by the combina-
tion which had control of the leasing of films in this
state, by unfair and unlawful discrimination against
201 85 Okla. at 239, 205 P. at 754.
202 147 Okla. 1, 294 P. 104 (1930).
203 Id. at 3, 294 P. at 106.
204 Id. We are without the advantage of knowing the exact
business practices complained of.
205 171 Okla. 259, 42 P.2d 861 (1935).
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him in the kind of films they permitted him to lease,
in the price charged for same, and by other unfair and
unjust methods of discrimination.20 6
The trial court dismissed the charges against Griffith be-
cause the acts complained of were in interstate commerce and
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.20 This,
of course, is inconsistent with the general assumption that
the federal antitrust laws were not intended to pre-empt the
field.208 A state law can prohibit action that might not be of-
fensive, and proscribed by federal antitrust standards. It was
not, however, necessary for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
reach this issue in the Griffith case. Dismissal of the petition
was affirmed on a technicality; that civil enforcement was
not available to county attorneys. 20
It was recognized by the Oklahoma court that the statute
could be read to reflect the intent of the Legislature that
county attorney's retained authority to enforce both the civil
and criminal provisions of the state antitrust laws.210 The
court, however, declined to make this extension of enforce-
ment authority, and thereby seriously curtailed public en-
forcement of the state antitrust laws.2 11
206 Id. at 259, 42 P.2d at 861-62.
2 07Id. at 260, 42 P.2d at 862.
208 p. AmA, ANTITUST AALxYsis 56 (1967), citing, Note, The
Commerce Clause and S t a t e Antitrust Regulation, 61
CoL m L. REv. 1469 (1961); Mosk, State Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 ABA
ANTRUST SECTION 358, 367 (1962).
209 OKLA. R. L. 1910 § 8231, OKLA. STAT. title 79, § 30 (1971).
"It shall be the duty of the county attorneys of the several
counties of this State, as well as the attorney general of
the State to prosecute all actions to enforce the criminal
provisions of this article."
210 171 Okla. at 260, 42 P.2d at 862 (1935).
211 Id. at 863, citing, Board of Commr's v. Huett, 35 Okla. 713,
130 P. 927 (1913), the court in the Griffith case stated that
"actions of this nature are required to be brought by the
Attorney General on information in the Supreme Court..."
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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The practices of Griffith were subsequently challenged
under the federal antitrust laws. On April 28, 1939, the gov-
ernment charged that the practice of Griffith violated Sec-
tion 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.212 Following the same strict
approach that curtailed the scope of the state law in State
v. Griffith, the federal trial court saw nothing wrong with the
practice of using closed towns to gain competitive control of
towns in which defendants had competition.2 13 The Supreme
Court disagreed and found monopolization; the case was re-
manded only for the purpose of determining the effect of this
monopoly power on competitors, and to fashion an effective
decree.2 14
Need to resort to federal law to correct an abuse of eco-
nomic power is inconsistent with the direction sought by
drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution. Murray, in setting the
tone for the Convention, had argued strongly for a home
grown version of populist agrarianism. 2 5 The draftees of the
Oklahoma Constitution had no desire to turn economic prob-
lems to federal courts; they were seeking to draft laws ef-
fectively drawn from "the American experience. ' 21 6 They
were seeking the aid of Oklahoma judges who were not in-
fluenced or controlled by the monopolists. 2
1 7
Out of a lack of enforcement and strict judicial interpre-
tation of Oklahomas antitrust laws, the federal laws have be-
(emphasis added). The statute, OILA. R. L. 1910, § 8221,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 21 (1971), provides that the Attorney
General "may file information in the Supreme Court."
(emphasis added.)
212 United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180,
181 (W.D. Okla. 1946), rev'd, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
218 United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100, 104
(1948).
214 Id. at 109.
2 15 MU.r y, supra note 24.
16 L. HuisT, supra note 3.
217 State v. Coyle, 8 Okla. Crim. 686, 130 P. 316 (1913).
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come the more dominant force for economic control.218 Con-
sequently, in spite of the great pleas expressed by drafters of
the Oklahoma Constitution, economic power in the State of
Oklahoma h as become highly concentrated. 219 Professor
French, in a report released in 1970, revealed that in 1960,
the total estimated wealth in the State, $14.5 billion in terms
of assets, was held by 15% of the State's population.2 0 It was
further shown in this report that 1.74% of the State's popu-
lation held an estimated 70% of all the 1960 estimated wealth;
and that 0.08% of the population held 43.1% of the wealth.221
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution, assembled in
Guthrie in 1906, had great visions for their new state. They
realized the magnitude of the delicate balancing task of pro-
moting industrial enterprise and preserving broad-based eco-
nomic opportunity. Alfalfa Bill Murray had said: "Let us
avoid the extremes of radical socialism on the one side and
extreme conservatism on the other, the extreme of a few men
owning everything on the one side and nobody owning any-
thing on the other." But by 1946, Murray feared that this
laudable dream of the Convention had been lost.
Perhaps it is now too late to recapture the spirit that in-
sures to all men the degree of freedom and liberty sought by
Murray and the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention. The
laws are still on the books to be enforced when there are
men with balanced vision who call for a vitalization of the
entire benefits of the Oklahoma Constitution. A sound regula-
tion of economic power, land ownership, and corporate mo-
nopoly calls for such balanced views held by men of good
will who are both "sensibly conservative and safely radical."
218 Compare, Petition of Grand River Dam Authority, 320 P.2d
706 (Okla. 1958); Otter Trail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366 (1973), Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961), FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405
U.S. 233 (1972).219 R. FENCH, WEALTH IN OxLAHoI_ (Bureau for Business and
Economic Research, University of Oklahoma 1970).22 0 Id. at 2.
2211&
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